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HEDGE FUND INVESTMENTS AND INVESTMENT BANKS
SEPTEMBER 2016
XIAOHUI YANG
B.S., CENTRAL SOUTH UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Mila Getmansky Sherman and Professor Hossein B. Kazemi
This dissertation focuses on studying how investment banks affect hedge fund equity
investments through acting as prime brokers for hedge funds. The first chapter studies
how the relationships between hedge funds and investment banks are maintained through
equity issuance and prime brokerage business. Using a comprehensive dataset of hedge
funds and IPO allocations, I examine IPO allocation decisions by investment banks to hedge
funds. I find that investment banks whose prime brokers have strong relationships with
hedge funds and are lead underwriters of IPOs tend to allocate more IPOs to these hedge
funds. Moreover, the allocation to hedge funds is larger when IPOs are underpriced, and the
allocations are larger during bearish periods compared to bullish periods. I further document
that hedge fund investments in IPOs are determined by the strength of hedge fund-prime
broker relationships, rather than by hedge fund manager skills. I also find that hedge funds
which have multiple prime brokers tend to invest in more IPOs. As a result, prime brokers
implicitly support hedge funds through favorable IPO allocations.
vi
The second chapter finds that hedge funds can profit from anticipating upcoming changes
in analysts’ recommendations before they become public. I provide evidence supporting the
hypothesis that hedge funds that have prime brokerage affiliations with analysts’ investment
banks have access to information on upcoming analysts’ recommendations. Focusing on
recommendations issued up to two days following stock holding report date, I find that large
hedge funds that are clients of the investment bank (affiliated hedge funds) tend to buy
upgrades and sell downgrades in a larger magnitude compared to other hedge funds before
the public release of recommendations. Moreover, relative to non-affiliated hedge funds,
affiliated hedge funds have a higher probability to trade in a way that is consistent with
upcoming recommendation changes and earn higher (or avoid lower) short-term abnormal
returns by buying (or selling) before upgrades (or downgrades). The results indicate that
prime brokerage affiliation is an important source of private information on analysts’ reports
for hedge funds.
The third chapter studies hedge funds’ equity investment strategies by examining the
investment value and risk consequence of their holdings concentration in large-cap and small-
cap stocks. We find that stocks, especially small-cap ones, with concentrated hedge fund
holdings earn higher future returns than those with less concentrated holdings. We also
find that stocks with concentrated hedge fund holdings have higher downside risks, and the
holdings concentration expedites the drop of stock performance, especially during financial
crisis. In addition, small-cap stocks with higher holdings concentration are associated with
hedge funds using higher leverage, consistent with Stein (2009) that deleverage leads to the
negative return shock and downside risks in stocks. Our findings suggest that hedge fund
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CHAPTER 1
HEDGE FUNDS AND PRIME BROKERS:
FAVORABLE IPO ALLOCATIONS
1.1 Introduction
The recent literature concentrated on the relationship between investment banks and
hedge funds. Hedge funds are very important clients for investment banks. 1 Hedge funds
rely on prime brokerage services provided by investment banks and produce significant rev-
enues for investment banks through a variety of services, such as securities lending, margin
financing, and settlement facilities. As a result, prime brokers aggressively compete among
each other to secure hedge funds’ business. A central question is whether the incentives to
initiate or maintain the prime brokerage business relationships drives investment banks to
favor their hedge fund clients by providing them with profitable investment opportunities.
Prime brokers are incentivized to favor their hedge fund clients in order to obtain and keep
their lucrative business. In this paper we study evidence of such favoritism and identify the
channel through which prime brokers favor their hedge fund clients.
In this paper, we examine how the relationships between hedge funds and investment
banks are maintained through equity issuance and prime brokerage businesses. Specifi-
cally, we test the favoritism of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) allocation by asking whether
investment banks reward their associated prime brokerage business clients by allocating un-
derpriced IPOs underwritten by them and whether the investment decisions in IPOs are
determined by hedge funds’ relationships with investment banks or by the managers’ skills.
1“Investment Banks Are Too Dependent on Hedge Funds”, Bloomberg News, 23 March 2005, sec. FP,
FP13. Moreover, according to Greenwich Associates, Wall Street collects $33 million a year in trading
commissions from the average hedge fund versus $16 million from the average mutual fund.
1
The topic of allocation of IPOs to institutional investors has long interested researchers.
It is well documented that IPO underwriters play a central role in determining the allo-
cation of IPO shares among different investors. Traditional bookbuilding theory of IPO
underpricing (e.g., Benveniste and Spindt (1989)) predicts that the lead underwriters will
allocate underpriced shares to induce investors to truthfully reveal private information on
demand for the IPO, and investors will help investment banks price and ultimately reduce
IPO underpricing for the issuer. In contrast, the recent agency-based explanation of IPO
allocations argues that lead underwriters have strong incentives to allocate “hot” issues that
are expected to trade up strongly in the aftermarket to their favored institutional clientele,
possibly in exchange for inflated brokerage commissions in subsequent trades or additional
investment banking businesses (e.g., Loughran and Ritter (2002), Reuter (2006)). Although
the two views are different in their underlying motives, they both predict that particular
groups of investors will be favored in allocating underpriced issues. Binay, Gatchev, and
Pirinsky (2007) find that, consistent with the bookbuilding theory of IPOs, underwriters fa-
vor institutional investors they have previously worked with in allocating underpriced IPOs.
Reuter (2006) documents a positive correlation between brokerage commissions that mutual
fund families paid for trade execution and the number of underpriced shares allocated by
the lead underwriters, providing support for the agency-based explanation.
Hedge funds are reported as the fastest growing contingent of the major IPO investor
types in the US IPO market. According to a survey by PwC 20162, the participation of
hedge funds in US IPOs has been increasing at a rate of 3% per year since 2013 and reached
24% in 2015. Despite the popularity of the allocation favoritism, however, little empirical
evidence has been provided on its efficiency as a mechanism for hedge fund investments in
IPOs, especially on how connections between hedge funds and investment banks are set up
to achieve the favoritism.
2See ”Considering an IPO? A continuing series Insight into the mindset of institutional IPO investors in
the US”, PwC, May 2016.
2
In this paper, we empirically study these connections through prime brokerage businesses
offered by investment banks to hedge funds. Act as intermediaries between hedge funds and
investment banks, prime brokers offer a bundle of basic services to hedge funds including
clearance, custody, securities lending, and financing (see Bryce (2008)), and earn a large
amount of revenue for investment banks by charging fees on financing and earning broker-
age commissions due to the frequent trading of hedge funds3. Given the enormous profits,
prime brokers compete for their customers by expanding their services and maintaining
their relationships with hedge funds through ancillary services such as IPO allocation, cap-
ital introduction, advising, consulting, and technical support. According to the theoretical
literature of IPO allocation, underwriters may favor their connected hedge fund customers,
and the quid pro quo for such favorable treatment is the growing prime brokerage business
relationship or the information on IPO demand provided by such connected hedge funds.
We contribute to the literature by identifying the channel through which prime brokers
tend to favor hedge fund clients. First, we identify investment banks which are lead un-
derwriters of IPOs. We then study whether hedge funds with prime brokerage business
relationships in these investment banks (i.e., relationship hedge funds) are more likely to in-
vest in these IPOs compared to hedge funds without such relationships (i.e., non-relationship
hedge funds). We expect that these relationships lead to a higher likelihood of hedge fund
investments in IPOs under favoritism. Second, we study whether investment banks tend
to allocate “hot” and underpriced IPOs to their clients compared to non-relationship hedge
funds. Given the favoritism mechanism, investment banks would like to allocate more shares
of underpriced issues to relationship hedge funds in order to attract more prime brokerage
businesses and earn higher brokerage fees. On the other hand, as quid pro quo for their pri-
vate information on demand for issues, hedge funds might be allocated “hotter” IPOs, which
3According to “Unsettled on Wall Street Institutional Investor Magazine, 14 October 2003 and “Hey Big
Spender, Analysts on Call International Herald Tribune, 6 March 2007, Hedge fund trading volume accounts
for 40 to 50 percent of the daily trading volume in US stock markets (Cox, 2006).
3
would reward hedge funds with higher returns. An interesting hypothesis we are able to
test here is regarding the prime brokerage relationship based allocation in “hot” and “cold”
IPOs. Specifically, we study whether prime brokers play an important role in supporting
relationship hedge fund investments in “hot” issues. Finally, using hedge fund data, we are
able to empirically examine whether hedge fund IPO investments are determined solely by
the investment banks or in part by fund manager skill. Would the hedge funds’ own charac-
teristics affect their investments in “hot” and “cold” IPOs? Answering the above questions
allows us to identify the function of prime brokers from the perspectives of both hedge funds
and investment banks.
To address the above issues, we organize our empirical analysis into two parts. First, we
study the pattern of IPO allocation to hedge funds from issuer-underwriter level analysis. We
empirically test the relationship hypothesis discussed earlier that hedge funds having prime
brokerage relationships with lead underwriters of an IPO are more likely to invest in that IPO
than are hedge funds without these relationships. Here we test prime allocation, which is the
propensity of allocating IPOs to relationship hedge funds, in terms of the IPO underpricing,
pre-market demand, issue size, lead underwriter reputation and other IPO characteristics.
Second, we use prime broker-fund relationships and funds’ own characteristics to analyze
hedge fund investments in IPOs. We examine relationship and non-relationship hedge fund
positions in “hot” and “cold” IPOs, respectively. We test the determinants of hedge fund
investments in IPOs including manager’s alpha, using multiple and reputed prime brokers,
and other funds’ own characteristics.
We use quarterly equity holdings disclosed in 13F filings with the SEC to infer the
IPO shares allocated to hedge fund companies as data on IPO allocations is not publicly
available. Our sample includes a universe of 215 hedge fund management companies with
135 prime brokers and 2,638 IPOs with 468 lead underwriters, spanning the period from
1994 through 2012. With this dataset, we are able to identify hedge funds with or without
prime brokerage relationships with lead underwriters of the owned IPOs. Further, in order
4
to infer the IPO allocations to hedge funds, we separate IPOs into “hot” and “cold” IPOs
using zero initial IPO return as a cutoff. The categorized sample allows us to analyze the
hedge fund investments separately.
We present a number of results on IPO allocations and hedge fund investments. In the
first part of our analysis, using issue-level data, we document the pattern of IPO allocations
by exploring the measure and the cross-sectional determinants of prime allocation. We find
that investment banks are more likely to allocate issues underwritten by them to their hedge
fund clients who have prime brokerage relationships with them. We further find that the
average prime allocation is not stationary over years, and it is more than 10 times higher
in the bearish period (2001-2003 and 2008-2009) than in bullish period. We interpret this
result as evidence that hedge funds request more favoritism in market downturns, and that
investment banks play an important role in helping relationship hedge funds or hedge funds
they previously worked with to get through the hard times. Our results suggest that prime
brokerage business relationships with lead underwriters increase the chances for relationship
hedge funds to access IPOs that are more underpriced and with higher demand revealed
during the book-building process - a result consistent with bookbuilding theory of IPO
allocations. The higher prime allocation to lower equity holdings relationship hedge funds
again provides evidence of the supportive role of prime brokers in hedge fund investments.
Our analysis of prime allocation provides considerable support for the relationship hy-
pothesis that hedge funds having prime brokerage relationships with the lead underwriters
of an IPO are more likely to invest in that IPO than are hedge funds without these rela-
tionships. In particular, our results support the favoritism that investment banks reward
their prime brokerage business relationship clients with profitable investment opportunities
– preferential access to “hot” IPOs, especially in market downturns.
In the second part of our analysis, using fund-level data, we separately study hedge fund
companies’ investments in IPOs owned by relationship (non-relationship) hedge funds and
in “hot” (“cold”) IPOs, relative to their asset under management. We document that hedge
5
fund investments in IPOs are determined by their business relationships with investment
banks, rather than by fund managers’ skills. According to the agency-based explanation
of IPO allocation, lead underwriters will use allocations of underpriced IPOs to reward
investors with which they have strong business relationships. Therefore, I include three
proxies for the closeness and strength of the relationships between hedge funds and lead
underwriters: multiple connections to prime brokers, the use of influential prime brokers,
and the participation in “hot” issues. We find that the use of multiple or top prime brokers
leads to more investments in IPOs owned by relationship hedge funds, but less in IPOs owned
by non-relationship hedge funds, and the relationship hedge funds put more investments in
IPOs than non-relationship hedge funds if a large number of “hot” issues are allocated to
the fund company. We further find that hedge fund companies have more investments in
“hot” issues if they have more prime broker-lead underwriter relationships, use a single
prime broker, or connect to smaller prime brokers. Our results suggest a resource dilution
or rebalance effect that the use of multiple or bigger prime brokers leads to the dilution of
valuable resources assigned to each individual hedge funds.
In our analysis, we also document that younger hedge funds invest more in “hot” issues,
and the relationship hedge funds with smaller lagged returns make more investments in IPOs.
Our results suggest that investment banks tend to support the start-up hedge funds or poorly-
performed hedge funds by providing them with more profitable investment opportunities.
Indirectly, the favorite allocations increase hedge fund investors’ confidence, and thus more
capital flows are introduced into hedge funds, which further suggests the incubative role of
prime brokers in helping hedge funds grow.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 briefly reviews the related
literature. Section 1.3 describes our sample and presents summary statistics. Section 1.4
defines our measure of favoritism, and analyzes the determinants of favorite IPO allocations.
Section 1.5 presents our results on relationship and non-relationship hedge fund investments
in IPOs, and the capital introduction through IPO allocations. Section 1.6 concludes.
6
1.2 Related literature
Our paper relates to two strands of literature. First, prime brokers have played an
important role in the emerging literature on relating hedge fund investments to investment
banks. Chuang and Teo (2012) show that, in order to earn commissions and fees from their
associated hedge fund clients, sell-side analysts tend to craft favorable reports for stocks
purchased by hedge funds who are the prime brokerage clients of their investment banks. It
argues that the analysts do not want to go against the investment view of their associated
hedge fund clients, and thus are optimistic about the stocks held by those hedge funds.
Klaus and Rzepkowski (2009) find that hedge funds using multiple prime brokers had a
better performance than those relying on a single prime broker. The competitions between
multiple prime brokers drive down the credit line and improve the margin, reducing the
funding risks faced by hedge funds.
Our paper is most closely related to Qian and Zhong (2014) that study the hedge funds
possession of private information through post-IPO stock abnormal returns. They show
that the connections between prime brokers and IPO underwriters are important sources of
private information for hedge funds. Different than their paper, our paper uses initial IPO
returns and fund returns to evaluate the effect of prime broker-lead underwriter relationships
on hedge fund investments in IPOs. Two other closely related papers are Goldie (2011) and
Chuang and Kang (2014) who also study the information provision role of prime brokers
from the relationships between hedge funds and investment banks. Goldie (2011) finds that
risk arbitrage hedge funds are more likely to invest in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) when
hedge funds’ prime brokers also work as advisors in the deals and that hedge funds outperform
naive portfolios of risk arbitrage investment by gaining information advantages through their
connections with investment banks. Chuang and Kang (2014) examine the comovement of
hedge fund returns using common information hypothesis, which suggests that the strong
comovement in the returns of hedge funds is induced by the valuable information provided
by the prime brokers.
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Our paper speaks to the relationship analysis based on the role of prime brokers, but we
explore the advantages of using relationships from a different angle. Our analysis suggests
that prime brokers support the investments and the growths of hedge funds directly through
favorable IPO allocations, rather than indirectly through information provision. Moreover,
our results supplement the existing literature on the ancillary services such as capital intro-
duction provided by prime brokers.
A second strand of literature is the favoritism of IPO allocations to institutional in-
vestors. As the traditional theoretical paradigm, bookbuilding theory by Benveniste and
Spindt (1989) argues that lead underwriters allocate underpriced IPOs to reward regular
investors for truthfully revealing private information on share values of IPOs, or for accept-
ing allocations in overpriced IPOs. In contrast, agency-based explanation of IPO allocations
by Loughran and Ritter (2002) and Reuter (2006) suggests that lead underwriters favor
the institutional investors who have strong business relationships with them by allocating
underpriced IPOs to those investors. Although the bookbuilding theory and agency-based
explanation predict the allocation of IPOs under different motivations of underwriters, they
are not mutually exclusive. The predictions of IPO allocations to particular groups by the
two views are consistent the notion of favoritism of the underwriters. For example, Reuter
(2006) exemplifies the favoritism of lead underwriters in the context of mutual funds, and
finds a positive correlation between yearly brokerage commissions paid by the funds to lead
underwriters and the IPOs participation of mutual fund families. His findings suggest that
business relationships with lead underwriters increase mutual funds’ access to underpriced
IPOs. Binay, Gatchev, and Pirinsky (2007) suggests that, as a favor, institutional investors
with past IPO participation with the lead underwriter are more likely to be allocated under-
priced IPOs than those without the past IPO participation relationships, as regular investors
help underwriters lower expected underpricing by providing information on demand for IPOs.
Our paper adds to the current IPO allocation favoritism literature that we document a
robust positive relationship between IPOs underpricing and the propensity of allocating IPOs
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to hedge funds with prime brokerage relationships with the lead underwriters. We do not
argue over the efficiency of the two views, as either one does not appear to completely explain
the entire relationship and non-relationship allocation differential (e.g., Aggarwal, Prabhala,
and Puri (2002)). We contribute to the IPO literature through developing evidence on how
connections are set up to achieve favorable allocations. In addition, different than other
IPO literature, our analysis of favoritism are not limited to the issuer-underwriter level, but
rather we use underwriter-investor relationships and investors characteristics to predict the
favorite allocations.
1.3 Data and sample characteristics
We compile a comprehensive dataset of hedge fund IPO ownership by extensively match-
ing data from hedge fund databases, 13F filings, and Securities data Companies (SDC). Our
final sample includes a universe of 215 hedge fund management companies with the asso-
ciated 3,300 individual hedge funds and 135 prime brokers, and 2,638 IPOs held by hedge
funds with the associated 468 lead underwriters, spanning the period from 1994 through
2012.
1.3.1 Construction of the sample
We identify IPOs offered between Jan 1994 and Dec 2012 from the Securities Data Com-
pany’s (SDC) New Issues database excluding American Depository Receipts, unit offerings,
closed-end funds, real estate investment trusts (REITs). We also exclude IPOs with offer
prices less than $5, and IPOs missing the first six days of information from the Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP), leaving 5,241 IPOs in our sample. We obtain IPO
related data including the offer price, initial price range, first-day closing price, shares, un-
derwriter syndicate (including the lead underwriters), and SIC code from SDC database.
We use CRSP to fill in any missing first-day closing prices.
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Due to the lack of IPO allocation data, we construct proxies for IPO allocations using
equity holdings of hedge funds from the same period. The hedge fund holdings data are based
on institutional holdings from 13F filings to Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
We separate hedge funds holdings from other institutional holdings by matching hedge fund
companies in hedge fund databases with those in 13F ownership databases.
We use information from TASS database to identify all hedge funds and hedge fund
management companies. The hedge fund databases provide information on monthly hedge
fund returns, on asset under management (thereafter, AUM), net asset values (thereafter,
NAV), and other fund characteristics. As a private investment company, hedge funds are not
required to register with the SEC, but those with more than $100 million under management
must report their holdings to the SEC each quarter on form 13F, including all long positions
(but no short position) in U.S. stocks and a few other securities greater than 10,000 shares
or $200,000 in the market value. Holdings are reported at the management company level
at the end of each calendar quarter.
Following the methodology of Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) and Griffin and Xu (2009),
we compile a list hedge fund management companies from TASS hedge fund databases, and
match them with the companies registered as investment advisers from 13F database. We
discard some companies whose hedge fund assets only make a small part of their aggregated
institutional portfolio. Since the name of a hedge fund company may not be the same
in different databases, we manually check unmatched investment advisers through online
searching to determine if they are hedge fund companies. We find records for 520 hedge
fund companies.
For each of the 520 companies, we check whether the firm is a registered investment
adviser with the SEC. We include a firm in our sample if it is not registered, since registration
is a prerequisite for conducting non-hedge fund business such as advising mutual funds and
pension plans. If the firm is registered, we obtain its ADV form and check its eligibility
for our sample based on two criteria: (1) at least 50% of its clients are “Other pooled
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investment vehicles (e.g., hedge funds)” or “High net worth individuals,” and (2) it charges
a performance fee for its advisory services. This process leaves us with 380 companies and
25,633 total stock holdings.
To identify hedge funds holdings in long positions, we focus solely on hedge funds using
long/short equity hedge, equity market neutral, and event driven strategies. To mitigate a
potential survivorship bias, we used both “Live” and “Graveyard” funds starting in 1994. If a
fund has missing asset under management, we quarterly interpolate the missing observations
using adjacent quarterly assets under management. We omit observations where no asset
under management was reported at the beginning or the end of the fund time series. We
also eliminate hedge funds having fewer than 24 months of observations. We winsorize fund
flows at top and bottom 1%. AUM and NAV are converted to US dollars if the original
currency is not US dollar. The monthly exchange rates of US dollar are downloaded from
Bloomberg.
After these filtering procedures, 215 hedge fund management companies with the man-
aged 3,300 individual hedge funds, and 2,638 IPOs with the associated 468 lead underwriters
are identified in our compiled databases.
To connect prime brokers to hedge funds IPOs investment, we incorporate information
on prime broker(s) that a hedge fund is associated with from the TASS hedge fund database.
Different than hedge fund holdings, prime brokers are identified at the fund level in these
databases, and a hedge fund may be associated with one or more prime brokers. Since
a management company often offers multiple hedge funds, we use all listed prime brokers
within the same institution for a hedge fund company.
Over the past ten years, the prime brokerage industry has been dominated by top invest-
ment banks. In the snapshot of TASS data in September 2012, there are 465 global prime
brokers, with top 10 biggest brokers account for about 85% of the market share in the global
hedge funds business. The ten major prime brokers ranked according to their market share in
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our sample, were, respectively, Goldman Sachs, Credit Suisse, Morgan Stanley, JP Morgan,
UBS, Deutsche Bank, Citi, Barclays, Bank of America Merrill Lynch, and Newedge.4
In our unreported summary statistics of filtered TASS database, there are 1,220 hedge
fund companies and 343 prime brokers. The prime brokers are reported by 49% of hedge
funds, among which about 17% declare to have multiple prime brokers. In our sample, we
excluded funds that did not report information on their prime brokers.
To check the bias caused by the dynamics of the relationships between hedge funds and
prime brokers, we examine the prime broker turnover using yearly snapshots of the TASS
database from 2006 to 2012. We measure the changes of prime brokers for each hedge fund
company and the changes of multiple prime brokers each calendar year. Similar to Goldie
(2011), we do not find significant turnover of prime brokers. The stable relationships between
hedge funds and prime brokers would not bias the results in this paper.
1.3.2 Summary statistics
Table 1.1 reports the fund characteristics at the company-level for the full sample from
TASS hedge fund database matched with 13F institutional holding data and SDC issue data
from 1994 through 2012. The characteristics include the number of hedge funds per company,
the number of prime brokers per company, the average alpha of the hedge funds per company,
the number of hedge funds with positive alpha per company, and the basic company-level
fund characteristics including AUM (in $ million), return, flow, age, and standard deviation
of return. In our sample, there are 216 hedge fund companies that manage 3,300 individual
hedge funds using long/short equity hedge, equity market neutral, or event driven strategies.
The average number of prime brokers used per company is 1.7, and 43% of the sample use
at least one prime brokers. From the compiled database, the average number of IPOs owned
a company is 8, which is only 0.7 percent of the average stocks held by each company.
4It is in accordance with the Wilson (2012), which covers more than $1.6 trillion of asset under manage-
ment of hedge funds.
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For a hedge fund company in each quarter, the alpha is estimated as the risk-adjusted
return by regressing the net-of-fee monthly excess return on the seven factors constructed
by Fung and Hsieh (2004). We elaborate the details of estimating alpha in section 4.2. In
Table 1.1, the mean of average alpha of the managed hedge funds per company is -0.08 and
the median is -0.024, suggesting that more than half of hedge funds have negative alpha,
and the distribution of alpha is skewed to the left. The statistics of other company-level
characteristics are estimated according to the measurement in section 4.1. The mean of
the CAUM, CReturn, and CFlow for each company is 212 ($ million), 0.025, and 24.8,
respectively.
Table 1.2 reports the summary statistics of the IPO sample based on the merged TASS,
SDC data, and 13F institutional holding data. The total number of IPO is 5,241 from 1994
to 2012, and 2,638 of these IPOs have hedge fund ownership at the end of the quarter in
which IPO takes place. The reported statistics in Panel A include the number of IPOs, offer
price, shares offered ($ million), initial IPO return, offer proceeds, and pre-IPO demand. The
mean initial IPO return, which is the day one return of IPO measured from the offer price to
the first-day closing price, is 26% in our sample. We partition IPOs owned by hedge funds
into hot versus cold IPOs using zero initial return as a cutoff, and the average initial return
for hot and cold IPOs is 36% and -0.05%, respectively. We examine hot versus cold IPOs
for most of our results throughout this paper. As expected, offer proceeds from hot IPOs
are higher than cold IPOs. The pre-IPO demand, calculated as the percentage difference
between the midpoint of the filing price range and the offer price, is 0.05 on average, and
the pre-IPO demand for hot IPOs is more than double as high as for cold IPOs.
Table 1.2 Panel B presents summary statistics of the IPO allocations on the company
level for the identified hedge funds. The reported statistics in Panel B include the number of
hedge fund companies, the number of IPOs allocated to each fund company, the allocation
frequency, the fraction of allocation, and the allocation value. The allocation frequency is
calculated as the ratio of the number of IPOs allocated to a fund company and the number
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of IPOs offered in each quarter. The fraction of allocation is calculated as the ratio of shares
allocated to a fund company and the shares offered in each quarter. The allocation value is
the average value of a fund company’s investment, calculated as shares allocated to hedge
funds times offer price. We report the statistics of hot IPOs and cold IPOs, respectively. In
our sample, there are on average 306 hot IPOs allocated to a fund company, compare to 231
cold IPOs received by the fund company. Moreover, the allocation frequency in hot IPOs
is 18, whereas it is 11 in cold IPOs. In particular, the fraction of allocation of hot IPOs
is 12.64%, which is twice as much as that of cold IPOs. Our results suggest that there are
more hot IPOs than cold IPOs in our sample, and the chance of getting allocations of hot
IPOs is higher that of cold IPOs.
1.4 Prime brokers and IPOs allocation
In this section, we quantitatively measure the role that prime brokers played in allocat-
ing IPOs to hedge funds. We then proceed to examine the determinants of propensity of
allocating IPOs to hedge funds with prime brokerage relationships with lead underwriters.
1.4.1 The measurement of IPOs allocation propensity
One of the main questions we address is whether hedge funds who have prime brokerage
relationships with the lead underwriters in an IPO are more likely to invest in that IPO. As
discussed above, in order to reward existing hedge funds customers and attract more prime
brokerage businesses, investment banks have incentives to increase the probability of IPOs
allocation to their high net-worth investors. In our analysis, following Binay, Gatchev, and
Pirinsky (2007), we quantify the role of prime brokers by measuring the propensity that hedge
funds are allocated an IPO conditional on their prime brokerage businesses relationships with
the lead underwriters of that IPO, compared to hedge funds without those relationships.
We focus on lead underwriters because they are most important in making IPO allocation
decisions.
14
For each IPO i in quarter t, we define the prime allocation (∆Pi,t) as the difference
between the probability that hedge funds get an allocation (Ai,t) of IPO i conditional on
their prime broker-lead underwriter relationships (Ri,t) and the unconditional allocation
probability:5








A HF investmentj,i,t is defined as the dollar value of IPO i owned by hedge fund company
j at quarter t, which is equal to the offer price times the holding shares of the hedge fund
company.6 n∗i,t and N
∗
t are, respectively, the number of hedge fund companies invested in IPO
i in quarter t and the number of IPOs in quarter t, conditional (or unconditional) on that
the hedge fund companies have prime brokerage relationships with the lead underwriter(s)
of IPO i.
We calculate the conditional probability of IPO allocation to hedge funds P (·|∗) as the
sum of hedge fund companies’ investments in quarter t in IPO i whose lead underwriter(s)
also provides prime brokerage services to the hedge funds listed in the companies, divided by
the sum of hedge fund companies’ investments in quarter t in all IPOs that are underwritten
by the same lead underwriter(s). The unconditional probability is the investments in IPO i in
quarter t of hedge fund companies divided by the sum of hedge fund companies’ investments
in all IPOs in the same quarter. We exclude the hedge funds that do not have any prime
broker-lead underwriter relationship.
The prime allocation explains the probability that an IPO is allocated to relationship
hedge funds in excess of the probability of allocating the IPO to all hedge funds. We expect
5Instead of unconditional probability P (Ai,t), we also use non-conditional probability P (Ai,t|¬Ri,t) as
the second term in measuring prime allocation . We obtain similar results in unreported tests.
6We get similar empirical results when we use the number of IPOs held by hedge fund company as Ai,t.
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that the prime allocation is positive since the relationship hedge funds are expected to get
more allocations of IPOs, according to our relationship hypothesis.
Table 1.3 Panel A shows the statistical analysis for the propensity of allocating IPOs to
relationship hedge funds. We estimate the allocation probability for totally 2,638 IPOs with
the average initial return 26.72% in our sample. The average probability of allocation IPOs to
hedge funds conditional on their prime brokerage relationships with the lead underwriters of
the IPOs is 31.12%, which is much higher than the average unconditional probability of IPO
allocation 7.91%. These results lead to a significantly positive allocation propensity 23.21%,
providing a strong evidence of the favoritism of investment banks. That is, investment banks
are more likely to favor their hedge fund clients who have prime broker-lead underwriter
relationships by allocating IPOs underwritten by them, indicating the supportive roles of
prime brokers in initiating and maintaining business relationships between hedge funds and
investment banks.
To evaluate the impact of IPO underpricing on the allocation propensity, we examine the
likelihood that the relationship hedge funds participate in IPOs with two different levels of
underpricing. We partition IPOs into hot and cold IPOs based on the zero initial IPO return,
and estimate the conditional allocation, unconditional allocation, and prime allocation in
each underpricing categories.
In Table 1.3 Panel A, we report the statistical analysis for hot and cold IPOs, as well as
aggregate statistics for all IPOs. The allocations in two underpricing categories are much
higher than the corresponding non-relationship allocations, leading to the significantly posi-
tive prime allocation in two categories. The propensity of allocating hot IPOs to relationship
hedge funds (24.73%) is significantly higher than the propensity of allocating cold IPOs to
them (17.60%). We test for the differences in the prime allocation between hot and cold
IPOs. The p-value from this test strongly rejects the null that the propensities of allocating
IPOs to relationship hedge funds are the same for hot and cold IPOs.
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Our statistical analysis provides evidence that, consistent with our relationship hypothe-
sis, hedge funds with prime brokerage business relationships with the lead underwriters of an
IPO are more likely to participate in the IPO than hedge funds without those relationships,
and investment banks are more inclined to allocate underpriced issues to favor their hedge
fund clients who request prime brokerage services from them.
To examine the evolution of the favoritism, we plot the yearly average prime allocations
of IPOs to relationship hedge funds from 1994-2012 in Figure 1.2. In order to control for the
market impact on IPO issuance, we standardize the average prime allocations by dividing it
by the ratio of the number of IPOs in year t and the number of IPOs over all years. The
average favoring behavior is not stationary over the time period. The likelihood of the excess
allocation tends to increase sharply in bearish period, and gradually goes back to normal as
the markets recover. From early 2000 to technical wreck (09/00-09/02), the prime allocation
increased by 32.45% as US economy transits from good to bad, and reached the highest
point 35% in 2001. In 2008-2009, hedge funds with prime brokerage business relationships
with the lead underwriters of an IPO are about 26% more likely to participate in that IPO
than the non-relationship hedge funds. Moreover, in 2008, the likelihood of allocating hot
IPOs to relationship hedge funds is 14% more than that of allocating cold IPOs to them.
In contrast, the likelihood of excess allocation to relationship hedge funds in bull market is
relatively stable.
We also provide statistical analyses of prime allocation over different time periods in
Table 1.3 Panel B. We divide our sample into five subperiods, among which 2001-2003 and
2008-2009 are bearish periods, and the rest time periods are bullish periods. Consistent
with the above analyses, the average prime allocation in each subperiod is positive, with
the highest value 37.56% in 2008-2009. Further, the allocation propensity of hot IPOs
is significantly higher than that of cold IPOs in all bearish periods. However, it is not
necessarily the case in bullish periods. In 2004-2007, the average prime allocation of hot IPOs
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is significantly lower than that of cold IPOs, suggesting that relationship hedge funds may
sometimes act as dumping grounds of IPO allocations for the investment banks’ benefits7.
A potential interpretation is that hedge funds request more favoritism in bear market
than in bull market. According to Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008), in market downturn,
the low market liquidity increases the risks of financing a trade, thus increasing margins and
restricting hedge funds from providing market liquidity. Hedge funds facing the increasing
funding risks look for profitable investment opportunities from their prime brokers. More-
over, in the post-crisis period, there are much less IPOs issued, but firms going public in this
period are significantly larger in terms of size and sales volume (see Henry and Gregorious
(2013)). A direct implication is that relationship hedge funds have a higher chance of receiv-
ing IPO shares of high quality firms when IPOs supply is low. In order to help hedge funds
get through the crisis and stabilize the market, investment banks tend to allocate their prime
brokerage clients more underpriced IPOs. Our sample statistics shows that hedge fund in-
vestments in hot IPOs contribute more to the increased prime allocations in 2008-2009 bear
market than to those in 2001-2003 bear market. A possible reason is that hedge funds using
long/short equity hedge and equity market neutral are affected little by the market down-
turn in 2001-2003, making the favorable allocation less necessary. Our results are also in
accordance with Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and Bakke, Leite, and Thorburn (2011) that
underwriters compensate investors by underpricing the issue more for truthfully revealing
positive private information in bear market than in bull market.
Alternatively, would it be possible that hedge funds’ past participation in IPOs leads to
the high prime allocation? As a reward for past participation, lead underwriters may allocate
more issues to their regular relationship hedge fund clients, especially in bear market when
favoritism is especially needed. Following Binay, Gatchev, and Pirinsky (2007), we measure
7Mooney (2013) finds that IPOs purchased by affiliated mutual funds have lower mean initial returns
than others, suggesting that investment banks may allocated cold IPOs to affiliated mutual funds to preserve
investment banking fee income at the expense of fund shareholders.
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the past relationship participation in each IPO which examines the likelihood that a hedge
fund participate in an IPO underwritten by the same lead investment bank within five
years of the current IPO. Our unreported results show that the average past relationship
participation is 27.12 percent and the highly positive excess probability indicates that hedge
funds with stronger past IPO business relationships with the lead underwriter are more
likely to participate in current IPO. Compare to non-relationship hedge funds, hedge funds
with prime broker relationships are 7.35 percent more likely to have past IPO business
participation. More important, similar to prime allocations to relationship hedge funds,
the past relationship participation also shows stronger likelihood of IPO allocation to hedge
funds in bear market. The statistical results provide an alternative interpretation that past
relationship IPO business participation can at least partly account for the pattern of prime
allocations in bearish periods.
1.4.2 Determinants of the prime allocation
To further examine whether investment banks favor the relationship hedge funds to a
greater extent than non-relationship hedge funds, we perform a multivariate regression of
the prime allocation (∆P ) on a variety of variables potentially related to IPOs allocation.
∆P = α + β1Initial IPO Return + β2Pre-IPO Demand + β3Log(Issuer Assets)
+ β4Log(Proceeds) + β5Log(HF Size) + β6Past Relation + β7Reputation
+ β8Lead UW Size + β9HighTech + β10VC Backed (1.2)
Table 1.4 reports results on the regression analysis of the IPO allocation to relationship
and non-relationship hedge funds for the entire samples, as well as samples in bullish and
bearish periods. The definitions of the determinants are as follows. Initial IPO Return is
the day one return of the IPO, measured from the offer price to the first-day closing price.
Pre-IPO Demand is the percentage difference between the midpoint of the filing range and
the offer price. Log(Issuer Assets) is the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets before
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the offering. Log(Proceeds) is the natural logarithm of the IPO offer proceeds. Log(HF
Size) is the natural logarithm of the average equity holdings of the hedge fund companies
participated in the IPO. Past Relation is the average historical relationship participation
for the lead underwriter’s IPOs over the past five years (see Binay, Gatchev, and Pirinsky
(2007)). Reputation is the lead underwriter reputation ranking obtained from Jay Ritter’s
web site (see Loughran and Ritter (2004)). Lead UW Size is the number of lead underwriters
of the IPO. HighTech equals one if the IPO firm is in high-tech and Internet IPOs (see
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) and Loughran and Ritter (2004)), and zero otherwise. VC
Backed equals one if the IPO has venture capital backing, and zero otherwise.
IPO underpricing and pre-market demand measures are highly correlated, but the offer
price does not fully adjusted to reflect pre-market interest in the book-building process (see
Benveniste and Spindt (1998) and Hanley (1993)). We include Initial IPO Return and
Pre-IPO Demand in our regression separately. The coefficients on these two variables in
both models are positive and significant, suggesting that the hotter the issue, the higher the
chance that investment banks allocate the issue underwritten by them to their hedge fund
clients who have prime brokerage relationship with them. Consistent with earlier univariate
statistics, these results suggest that investment banks tend to favor their relationship hedge
funds by providing them more profitable investment opportunities.
Table 1.4 also shows that lead underwriters reward the prime brokerage relationship hedge
funds by allocating them issues of bigger firms, according to the positive and significant
coefficients on Log(Issuer Asset). These results support the favoritism of the underwriters to
hedge funds since bigger firms are generally considered to have more stock market liquidity.
The coefficients on Log(Proceeds) in both models are positive and significant, suggesting
positive connections between IPO allocation and issue size. The coefficients on average
hedge funds equity holdings are negative and significant for prime allocation, indicating that
the lower equity holdings are associated with the higher probability of allocating IPOs to
relationship hedge funds. This provides evidence that investment banks are more likely
20
to favor start-up or young in equity investment relationship hedge funds, suggesting the
supportive role of prime brokers in hedge fund growth.
In our regression, Past Relation is included to control for the past IPO business partici-
pation. The regression coefficients on Past Relation in all models are positive and significant,
suggesting that relationship hedge funds are more likely to be allocated current IPOs if they
also have past IPO business relationship with the lead underwriter.
Relationship hedge funds also have higher chance of being allocated issues with more
lead underwriters and issues underwritten by reputed lead investment banks. This situation
can arise because more reputable investment have wider access to hedge funds, and the
IPO participation is consequently higher for relationship hedge funds connected to those
investment banks. The coefficients on Internet and technology IPOs and VC-backed IPOs,
however, are not significant. We also control for the quarter and the industry of the IPO by
including time and industry fixed effects, and the F-statistics are significant for all models.
1.5 Prime brokers and hedge fund investments in IPOs
Our results in previous section suggest that lead investment banks are more inclined to
allocate IPOs to hedge funds having prime brokerage relationships with them, and the role
of prime brokers are analyzed using IPO characteristics. In this section, we use hedge fund
characteristics to study how the hedge fund investment decisions in IPOs are affected by
prime brokers and the fund itself. We separately analyze the determinants of hedge fund
companies’ investments in IPOs owned by relationship (or, non-relationship) hedge funds
and in hot (or, cold) IPOs. We also study how the hedge fund investor flows are affected
after IPO allocations.
1.5.1 Relationship hedge fund investments in IPOs
A concern we address in this section is whether the prime brokers would affect hedge
fund investments in IPOs, and in particular, whether hedge funds with prime brokerage
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relationship with the lead underwriters of the owned IPOs tend to make IPO investment
decisions differently, compared to non-relationship hedge funds. In our analysis, we test
whether this process relies in part on using multiple prime brokers and big prime brokers8,
and on receiving allocations from friendly lead underwriters, after controlling for funds own
characteristics.
For comparison purposes, we run a pooled regression of the company’s IPO investments
by relationship and non-relationship hedge funds, respectively, as a fraction of the company’s
AUM on the characteristics of prime brokers and hedge funds. The regression has the
following specification:
IAi,t = α + β1MultiPBsi,t + β2BigPBsi,t + β3HotIPOsi,t + β5Controlsi,t−1 + εi,t (1.3)
where IAi,t is IPO investments by relationship (or, non-relationship) hedge funds measured
by the percentage of AUM of company i in quarter t, MultiPBsi,t is a dummy variable indi-
cating whether the fund company i has more than one prime brokers in quarter t, BigPBsi,t
is the number of top ten prime brokers of the fund company i in quarter t, HotIPOsi,t is
the number of hot IPOs participated in by the fund company i in quarter t. MultiPBsi,t,
BigPBsi,t, and HotIPOsi,t indicate the closeness in the relationships between hedge funds
and lead underwriters. The control variables include the funds’ return, flow, age, and stan-
dard deviation.
Since the IPO holdings data is company-based, we upgrade fund-level characteristics to
the company-level to satisfy the consistency requirements. We first calculate a hedge fund
company i’s asset under management (CAUMi,t−1) and net asset value (CNAVi,t−1) as the
sum of AUMs and per share sum of AUMs of all hedge funds managed by the company at
quarter t − 1. We then compute the quarterly return (CReturni,t−1) and net money flow
8We think the geographical closeness of hedge funds and prime brokers is also an important factor in
determining their relationships, but we are not able to include it in our regression due to the data limitations.
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CAUMi,t−1 − CAUMi,t−2(1 + CReturni,t−1)
CAUMi,t−2
(1.5)
We also compute the Agei,t−1 of the company as the the asset weighted average age of the
managed hedge funds and the CReturnStdi,t−1 as the standard deviation of the return of
the fund company at quarter t− 1.
Table 1.5 reports the results from the above regression after adjusting standard errors
for two-way clustering at the company and quarter level. We include the three characteristic
variables separately in our regression to avoid potential correlations. For the relationship
hedge funds, the coefficient on the MultiPBsi,t dummy is positive and significant, whereas
it is significantly negative for non-relationship hedge funds, suggesting that using multiple
prime brokers is associated with higher IPO investments by relationship hedge funds but
lower IPO investments by non-relationship hedge funds. We interpret this result as evidence
that, for relationship hedge funds, using multiple prime brokers should contribute to more
connections between hedge funds and lead underwriters, leading to a higher chance of getting
IPO allocations from these relationships. On the other hand, as hedge funds spread balances
across multiple prime brokers, the valuable resources from each prime broker are diluted or
reduced to a greater extent, compared to those from a exclusively single prime broker. This
is especially so for IPO investments by non-relationship hedge funds since their chances of
getting IPO allocations are smaller than relationship hedge funds, according to our findings
in Section 3.2.
To further test the strength of hedge fund-prime broker relationships, we examine the
number of influential prime brokers that a fund company is associated with. Since big prime
brokers receive a lion’s share of hedge fund business revenue, we expect that they should
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reward their hedge fund clients by allocating more IPOs. Our test results support this
conjecture. The coefficient on BigPBsi,t is positive and significant for relationship hedge
funds at 1% level, suggesting that hedge funds tend to make more IPO investments if their
prime brokers topped in providing brokerage businesses. Of course, hedge funds without
prime broker-lead underwriter relationships cannot get extra rewards for using big prime
brokers. The significantly negative coefficient on BigPBsi,t for non-relationship hedge funds
is consistent with the dilution effect that using more big prime brokers leads to the less
allocations of IPOs.
We also examine the relationship between the ownership of underpriced IPOs and hedge
fund investments in IPOs. As expected, the coefficients on HotIPOsi,t for relationship
and non-relationship hedge funds are both positive and significant at 1% level, and the
relationship hedge funds have more investments in IPOs than non-relationship hedge funds
if a large number of hot issues are allocated to the fund company. The results suggest
that prime brokerage business relationships facilitate hedge fund investments in IPOs, and
a stronger relationship will lead to more profitable investment opportunities.
The coefficient on the lagged return for relationship hedge funds is significant and neg-
ative, suggesting that the lower lagged return is associated with the higher investment in
IPOs by relationship hedge funds. The coefficients on non-relationship hedge funds, however,
are not significant, again proving the favoritism of investment banks on relationship hedge
funds. We interpret this as evidence that investment banks help their prime brokerage busi-
ness clients through hard times by allocating them more IPOs. The roles that prime brokers
assume are not limited to the traditional services provider such as clearer or financier, but
are extended to facilitator or supporter to the growth of hedge funds.
We also find that the coefficient on the lagged average age of hedge funds is negative
and significant for non-relationship hedge funds, but is insignificant for relationship hedge
funds. This suggests that lead underwriters tend to allocate more IPOs to younger hedge
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fund investors, and the connections between prime brokers and lead underwriters balance
the age effect and relationship effect out for relationship hedge funds.
We test for the difference in the coefficients on the multiple prime brokers, big prime bro-
kers, and hot IPOs between relationship and non-relationship hedge funds. The p-value from
this test strongly rejects the null that the regression coefficients are the same for relationship
and non-relationship hedge funds.
1.5.2 Hedge fund investments in hot and cold IPOs
We now examine whether hedge fund investments in IPOs are explained by the rela-
tionships between prime brokers and IPO lead underwriters or by the hedge fund alpha.
Specifically, we would like to test whether hedge fund investments in IPOs are determined
by the allocation decision of investment banks or by the managers’ skills. In our analysis,
we regress a hedge fund company’s investment in hot IPOs and cold IPOs, respectively, as
a fraction of company’s AUM on the prime broker-lead underwriter relationship and the
alpha. The regression has the following specification:
IAi,t = α + β1Relationshipi,t + β2Alphai,t + β3MultiPBsi,t + β4BigPBsi,t
+ β5Controlsi,t−1 + εi,t (1.6)
where IAi,t is hedge fund investments in hot (or, cold) IPOs measured by the percentage of
AUM of company i in quarter t, Relationshipi,t is a dummy variable indicating whether more
than half of the IPOs owned by the fund company i are allocated to the managed relationship
hedge funds in quarter t, Alphai,t is the percentage of positive alpha of the managed hedge
funds of company i in quarter t, MultiPBsi,t is a dummy variable indicating whether the
fund company i has more than one prime brokers in quarter t, BigPBsi,t is the percentage
of top ten prime brokers of the fund company i in quarter t. The definitions of other control
variables can be found in section 4.1.
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To estimate alpha of individual hedge funds, we adopt a rolling-window method to regress
the net-of-fee monthly excess return (in excess of risk-free rate) of each hedge fund on the
seven factors constructed by Fung and Hsieh (2004). The seven factors include the S&P
500 monthly return minus risk free rate, Russell 2000 index monthly return minus S&P
500 monthly return, change in the 10-year treasury constant maturity yield, change in the
Moody’s Baa yield less 10-year treasury constant maturity yield, the return of bond primitive
trend-following strategy, the return of currency primitive trend following strategy, and the
return of commodity primitive trend-following strategy. Following Naik, Ramadorai, and
Stromqvist (2007), for each month, we calculate a funds’ factor loadings of the seven factors
using the previous 24 months of data, and obtain the risk-adjusted return as the hedge fund
alpha. In our sample, 32.75% hedge funds have positive alpha and 67.25% have negative
alpha. A fund company’s Alphai,t is calculated as the percentage of positive alphas of the
managed hedge funds in the same company.
Table 1.6 reports the results on the regression analysis of hedge fund investments in hot
and cold IPOs. The coefficient on Relationshipi,t is positive and significant for hot IPO in-
vestments, suggesting that the stronger connections bridged by prime brokers between hedge
funds and lead underwriters are associated with a significantly higher level of hedge fund
investments in hot IPOs. The coefficient on relationship dummy for cold IPO investments
is not significant. These results are consistent with the favoritism of investment banks on
relationship hedge fund customers. We also test for the differences on Relationshipi,t be-
tween hot and cold IPO investments. The p-value from this test strongly rejects the null
hypothesis that the regression coefficients are the same for hot and cold IPO investments.
As expected, the coefficients on Alphai,t are not significant for hedge fund investments
in both hot and cold IPOs, suggesting that there is no evidence of “hot hand” of hedge fund
managers in picking hot IPOs, and it is the underwriter that determines the allocation of
IPOs to hedge funds.
26
In Table 1.6, we examine the effect of hedge fund-prime broker relationship characteristics
on hot and cold IPO investment. The coefficients on MultiPBsi,t and BigPBsi,t are negative
and significant for hot IPO investments, showing that using multiple prime brokers and using
more big prime brokers are associated with less hot IPO allocations. Consistent with the
findings in Section 4.1, these results provide evidence of resources rebalancing, that is, as
hedge funds spread balances across multiple prime brokers, the valuable resources from each
prime broker are diluted or reduced to a greater extent, compared to those from a exclusively
single prime broker. In addition, the resources in big prime brokers are not as concentrated as
those in small prime brokers, leading to the possible smaller allocations of hot issues to most
of their brokerage clients. These coefficients on cold IPO investments are not significant.
The coefficient on the lagged average age of the managed hedge funds is significantly
negative for hot IPO investments but is not significant for cold IPO investments, suggesting
that younger hedge funds are more likely to be allocated hot IPOs. We interpret these
results as evidence of competition between investment banks. In order to attract more
prime brokerage or other businesses, lead underwriters allocate more underpriced issues to
their new clients, whereas assign more overpriced issues to the aged clients who have already
had a stable prime brokerage business relationship with them. Through allocating hot IPOs,
investment banks send signals to the start-up hedge funds that they play a role in helping
funds formation and expect future cooperation. These findings are also consistent with Liang
(1999) that younger funds outperform aged funds in average performance.
To summary, hedge fund investments in IPOs are basically determined by the bank side
rather than by the fund manager side. Hedge funds that are younger, with prime brokerage
relationship with lead underwriters of the owned IPOs, use single prime broker, or connect
to smaller prime brokers are more likely to get allocations of hot IPOs.
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1.5.3 Capital introduction through IPOs
So far we have examined the relationship and non-relationship hedge fund investments in
hot and cold IPOs. An interesting question is whether the allocation of IPOs helps increasing
investors’ flow into hedge funds? In other words, would the capital introduction be a side
effect of the IPOs allocation?
As prime brokers vie for hedge fund businesses, they seek an edge by helping hedge funds
attract new investors. An introduction from a prime broker can help investors identify new
managers based on the credit checks performed directly by the lender or the reputations put
indirectly behind by the brokerage firm. The connections between hedge funds and prime
brokers built through IPO allocations may send a signal to investors that the investments
would be beneficial and reliable if more underpriced IPOs are allocated to the funds.
We regress the hedge fund company’s flows on the lagged IPO initial return and other
lagged fund characteristics. We expect that there are more capital inflows after the allocation
of hot IPOs. The regression has the following specification:
CFlowi,t = α + β1Initial IPO Returni,t−1 + β2Relationshipi,t−1
+ β3MultiPBsi,t + β4BigPBsi,t + β5Controlsi,t−1 + εi,t (1.7)
where CFlowi,t is measured by the hedge fund company i’s net money flows in quarter
t. Initial IPO Returni,t−1 is the average initial returns of the IPOs owned by the fund
company i at time t − 1. Definitions of the other variables can be found in section 4.1 and
4.2.
Table 1.7 reports the results on the regression analysis of hedge fund flows on IPO initial
returns. The coefficient on Initial IPO Returni,t−1 for net money flows is positive and
significant, suggesting that the more investments in the lagged underpriced IPOs are asso-
ciated with the higher hedge fund inflows. A potential interpretation is that the allocation
of hot IPOs increases the investors’ confidence on a hedge fund since investment banks tend
to reward the client who raises big commission revenue for them through qualified business
28
relationship. The test results support our conjecture that there are more capital inflows after
hot IPOs are assigned, providing evidence that the IPOs allocation mechanism contribute
to the capital introduction to hedge funds.
We also examine the impact of prime broker characteristics on hedge fund flows. The
coefficient on MultiPBst is positive and significant, suggesting that using multiple prime
brokers is associated with the higher investors’ flows. This result is consistent with the role
of prime brokers in capital introduction in that the use of multiple prime brokers provides
multi-assurance for investors to make investment decisions. The coefficients on the prime
broker-lead underwriter relationships and big prime brokers are not significant.
In addition, consistent with hedge fund literature, the coefficient on the lagged hedge
fund company’s flows is significantly positive, and the coefficient on the average age of the
managed hedge funds in the fund company is significant and negative, indicating the investors
tend to invest in younger hedge funds.
1.6 Conclusions
In this paper, we use a comprehensive dataset composed of hand-collected data on hedge
fund ownership and IPO issuance data from 1994 to 2012 in order to analyze the role of prime
brokers in hedge fund investments in IPOs. Our empirical results show that hedge funds
having prime brokerage relationships with the lead underwriters of an IPO are more likely to
invest in that IPO than are hedge funds without these relationships. Our results support the
favoritism in the literature that investment banks reward their business relationship clients
with underpriced IPOs.
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and Reuter (2006) have shown that IPOs are allocated
to particular groups of investors under different motivations. Our analyses suggest that, in
order to earn inflated brokerage fees, or to attract additional prime brokerage businesses,
investment banks reward their hedge fund customers with underpriced issues underwritten
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by them. The existence and the strength of the hedge funds’ business relationships with
investment banks will affect the degree of being favored in IPO investments.
Our research adds to the current literature in IPO allocations to hedge funds and in
ancillary services provided by prime brokers. In addition to the traditional role of secu-
rities lending and margin financing, prime brokers implicitly intermediate the hedge fund
investments and introduce capital into hedge funds. Prime brokers show their support to
hedge funds through favoring IPO allocations, especially for start-up hedge funds or poorly-
performed hedge funds, and in economic downturns. Overall, our results suggest that prime
brokers play a supportive role in hedge fund investments and growth, in expectation of stable































































































Bear Market All IPOs Hot IPOs Cold IPOs
Figure 1.1: The number of IPOs over time
This figure plots the number of all IPOs, as well as the number of hot and cold IPOs. We define issues with initial returns
greater than zero as hot IPOs, and as cold IPOs otherwise. The sample period extends from 1994-2012, and the bear markets


























































































Bear market Hot IPOs All IPOs Cold IPOs
Figure 1.2: The evolution of prime allocations
This figure plots the evolution of average prime allocations of all IPOs, as well as hot and cold IPOs, to relationship hedge
funds. We define issues with initial returns greater than zero as hot IPOs, and as cold IPOs otherwise. The sample period
extends from 1994-2012, and the bear markets are from 2001 to 2003 and from 2008 to 2009.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics of Hedge Fund Data
The table presents summary statistics of the time-series average of cross-sectional hedge fund company data in our sample.
The source of hedge fund companies are from TASS hedge fund database matched with 13F institutional holding data
and SDC issue data from 1994 through 2012. The reported statistics are on the hedge fund company level, including the
number of hedge funds per company, the number of prime brokers per company, the number of IPOs owned per company,
the average alpha of the hedge funds per company, the number of hedge funds with positive alpha per company, and the
basic company-level fund characteristics including CAUM (in $ million), CReturn, CFlow, CAge, and CReturnStd. The
reported statistics include mean, standard deviation, the 25th percentile, median, and the 75th percentile.
Number of hedge fund companies 216
Number of hedge funds 3,300
Number of prime brokers 135
Mean St. Dev. Pctl(25) Median Pctl(75)
Number of hedge funds 1.63 1.36 1 1 2
Number of prime brokers 1.7 1 1 1 2
Number of IPOs 8 9 5 1 45
Average alpha −0.08 6.51 −0.071 −0.024 0.024
Number of HFs with (+)alpha 0.58 0.94 0 0 1
CAUM ($ million) 212 649 13 44 155
CReturn (qtr) 0.025 0.16 −0.018 0.020 0.063
CFlow (qtr) 24.8 4,959 −0.034 0.010 0.11
CAge (qtr) 3.61 1.088 3.05 3.78 4.37
CReturnStd (qtr) 0.066 0.13 0.031 0.040 0.053
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics of IPO Data
The table presents summary statistics of the IPO data in our sample. The source of IPOs are from SDC issue data matched
with 13F institutional holding data and TASS hedge fund database from 1994 through 2012. The reported statistics in
Panel A include the number of IPOs, offer price, shares offered ($ million), initial IPO return, which is the day one return
of the IPO measured from the offer price to the first-day closing price, offer proceeds, and pre-IPO demand, which is the
percentage difference between the midpoint of the filing price range and the offer price.
The reported statistics in Panel B include the number of hedge fund companies each quarter, the number of allocation
a fund company receives each quarter, the frequency of allocations each quarter, which is calculated as the ratio of the
number of IPOs allocated to a fund company and the number of IPOs offered in each quarter, the fraction of allocation a
fund company receives each quarter, which is calculated as the ratio of shares allocated to a fund company and the shares
offered in each quarter, the allocation value, which is calculated as average value of shares allocated to hedge funds times
offer price. We partition IPOs into hot versus cold IPOs using zero initial IPO return as a cutoff.
Panel A: Summary Statistics of IPO Data
Number of IPOs 2,638
Number of lead managers 468
All sample Hot IPOs Cold IPOs
Number of IPOs 2,638 2,073 625
Offer price
Mean 14.63 14.92 13.59
Median 14 14.5 13
Shares offered (million)
Mean 10.83 10.53 11.90
Median 5 5 5.8
Initial IPO return
Mean 0.26 0.36 -0.05
Median 0.11 0.17 -0.007
Offer proceeds (million)
Mean 176.50 246.13 186.22
Median 72 71.60 75.01
Pre-IPO demand
Mean 0.05 0.08 -0.04
Median 0 0.04 -0.08
Panel B: IPOs allocation on company level
Hot IPOs Cold IPOs
Number of HF companies 198 175






Fraction of allocation (qtr)
mean 12.64 6.38
median 6 4




Table 1.3: Statistical analysis of IPO allocation to relationship hedge funds
This table presents the statistical analysis for the propensity of allocating IPOs to relationship hedge funds. Our sample
has 2,638 IPOs from 1994 through 2012 from SDC database. We partition IPOs into hot and cold IPOs based on the
zero initial return. The reported statistics include IPO sample size, Initial IPO return, the conditional allocation, which
is the probability that hedge funds get an allocation conditional on their prime broker-lead underwriter relationships, the
unconditional allocation, which is the probability that the general hedge funds get an allocation of the IPO, and the prime
allocation, which is defined as the difference between the conditional and unconditional allocation. Panel A reports the
statistical analysis of prime allocation for hot and cold IPOs, as well as aggregate data for all IPOs. Panel B reports the
prime allocation of 5 subperiods, among which 2001-2003 and 2008-2009 are bearish periods, and the rest time periods
are bullish periods. The last column tests the significance of the differences in the means, with p-values in parentheses.
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: IPOs allocation
All IPOs Hot IPOs Cold IPOs Test Equality
IPO sample size 2,638 2,073 625
Initial IPO return
mean 26.72% 35.88% -5.24% (<0.0001)***
median 11.11% 16.92% -0.67%
Conditional allocation
mean 31.12% 33.09% 55.06% (<0.0001)***
median 6.35% 7.34% 79.61%
Unconditional allocation
mean 7.91% 8.35% 37.45% (<0.0001)***
median 2.45% 2.83% 23.15%
Prime allocation (∆P )
mean 23.21% 24.73% 17.60% (0.0011)***
median 2.87% 3.39% 2.65%
Panel B: prime allocation by periods
Prime allocation (∆P )
All IPOs Hot IPOs Cold IPOs Test Equality
1994-2000
N 1154 1093 61
mean 23.93% 25.52% -4.71% (<0.0001)***
2001-2003
N 335 293 42
mean 25.27% 28.48% 2.82% (0.0001)***
2004-2007
N 765 623 142
mean 22.71% 20.81% 31.08% (0.001)***
2008-2009
N 75 57 18
mean 37.56% 42.60% 21.60% (0.049)**
2010-2012
N 302 216 86
mean 22.27% 23.50% 19.16% (0.33)
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Table 1.4: Regression analysis of IPOs allocation to relationship hedge funds
The table reports estimates of a multivariate regression for 2,638 IPOs offered between 1994 and 2012. The dependent
variable is the Prime Allocation (∆P ), defined as the difference between the probability that hedge funds get an allocation
of IPO conditional on their prime broker-lead underwriter relationships and the unconditional allocation probability.
Independent variables include the day one return of the IPO, measured from the offer price to the first-day closing price
(Initial IPO Return), the percentage difference between the midpoint of the filing range and the offer price (Pre-IPO
Demand), the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets before the offering (Log(Issuer Assets)), the natural logarithm
of the IPO offer proceeds (Log(Proceeds)), the natural logarithm of the average equity holdings of the hedge fund companies
participated in the IPO (Log(HF Size)), the average historical relationship participation for the lead underwriter’s IPOs
over the past five years (Past Relation), the lead underwriter reputation ranking obtained from Jay Ritter’s web site
(Reputation), the number of lead underwriters of the IPO (Lead UW Size), a high-tech and Internet IPO dummy variable
(HighTech), and a venture capital backed IPO dummy variable (VC Backed). The table reports the estimated coefficients
from 1994-2012, among which 2001-2003 and 2008-2009 are bearish periods, and the rest time periods are bullish periods.
Standard errors are presented in parentheses. The last three rows report the number of observations, the adjusted R2,
and the F-tests results of each regression. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: Prime Allocation (∆P )
All samples Bullish periods Bearish periods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial IPO return 5.842∗∗∗ 5.301∗∗∗ 6.147∗∗
(1.238) (1.389) (2.888)
Pre-IPO demand 17.751∗∗∗ 17.602∗∗∗ N/A
(6.633) (6.785)
Issuer assets (log) 1.420 2.585∗ 2.008∗∗ 2.206 −1.650
(0.890) (1.356) (0.955) (1.456) (2.546)
Proceeds (log) 4.602∗∗∗ 3.913 3.015∗ 4.630 6.776∗
(1.488) (2.641) (1.621) (2.876) (3.957)
HF size (log) −3.418∗∗∗ −6.166∗∗∗ −2.834∗∗∗ −6.673∗∗∗ −4.307∗∗∗
(0.649) (1.618) (0.743) (1.746) (1.535)
Past relation 0.573∗∗∗ 0.482∗∗∗ 0.604∗∗∗ 0.465∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗
(0.071) (0.109) (0.073) (0.110) (0.227)
Reputation 0.407∗∗∗ −0.145 0.417∗∗∗ −0.128 0.290
(0.114) (0.398) (0.120) (0.401) (0.343)
Lead UW size 1.020∗∗∗ 2.802∗∗ 1.217∗∗∗ 2.893∗∗ 0.443
(0.337) (1.409) (0.367) (1.464) (0.855)
HighTech 1.992 3.033 1.292 2.753 4.920
(1.819) (3.188) (1.933) (3.239) (5.096)
VC backed −3.092 −2.798 −1.526 −2.103 −13.556∗∗
(1.930) (3.178) (2.053) (3.303) (5.469)
Constant 28.056∗∗ 74.622∗∗ 19.590 81.807∗∗ 62.779
(13.384) (31.150) (14.701) (32.782) (39.403)
Time fixed effects
F-statistics 18.65∗∗∗ 8.90∗∗∗ 17.79∗∗∗ 8.54∗∗∗ 2.85∗∗∗
p-value (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (0.0034)
Industry fixed effects
F-statistics 19.07∗∗∗ 9.26∗∗∗ 16.06∗∗∗ 8.86∗∗∗ 3.46∗∗∗
p-value (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (0.0005)
Observations 1,263 377 1,036 367 227 10
Adjusted R2 0.133 0.196 0.138 0.193 0.112





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.6: Regression Analysis of Hedge Fund Investments in hot and cold IPOs
The table presents regression analysis of hedge fund investments in hot and cold IPOs at the fund company level. The
dependent variable is the IA Hott (or, IA Coldt), which is calculated as the ratio of hot (or, cold) IPO investments to
the hedge fund company’s asset under management. Independent variables include a dummy variable which is one if
more than half of the IPOs owned by relationship hedge fund in the fund company, and zero otherwise (Relationshipt),
the fraction of hedge funds with positive alpha in the fund company Alphat, a dummy variable which is one if the fund
company has more than one prime brokers and zero otherwise (MultiPBst), the percentage of top ten prime brokers of
the fund company (BigPBsi,t), the hedge fund company’s return at time t − 1 (CReturnt−1), the quarterly net money
flow of fund company at time t− 1 (CFlowt−1), the average age of the managed hedge funds in the fund company at time
t− 1 (Aget−1), the standard deviation of the return of the fund company at time t− 1 (CReturnStdt−1), and a dummy
variable which is one if more than half of hedge funds use leverage in the fund company, and zero otherwise (Leverage).
The table reports the estimated coefficients using pooled regression with two-way clustered standard errors. Standard
errors are presented in parentheses. The last three rows report the number of observations, the adjusted R2, and the
F-tests results of each regression. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable:





Alphat −0.225 0.047 −0.272
(0.180) (0.069) (0.198)
MultiPBst −0.443∗∗ 0.024 −0.468∗∗
(0.332) (0.105) (0.180)
BigPBst −0.585∗∗ 0.085 −0.670∗∗∗
(0.208) (0.118) (0.318)
CReturnt−1 0.016 −0.017 0.033
(0.632) (0.217) (0.683)
CFlowt−1 −0.104 0.037 −0.141
(0.135) (0.107) (0.191)
CAget−1 −0.237∗∗ 0.016 −0.253∗∗
(0.135) (0.063) (0.149)
CReturnStdt−1 0.465 0.307 0.158
(0.657) (0.344) (0.760)
Leverage 0.387∗ 0.014 0.373∗
(0.221) (0.098) (0.206)
Constant 3.291∗∗∗ 0.126 3.165∗∗∗
(0.221) (0.207) (0.457)
Observations 911 911 911
Adjusted R2 0.054 -0.004 0.045
F Statistic 7.440∗∗∗ 0.553 6.402∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 1.7: Regression Analysis of Post-IPO Hedge Fund Flows
The table presents regression analysis of Post-IPO hedge fund flows and returns on the fund company level. The dependent
variable is the quarterly net money flow of the fund company (CFlowt). Independent variables include the average initial
returns of the IPOs owned by the fund company at time t − 1 (Initial IPO Returnt−1), the relationship variable,
which is calculated as the fraction of IPOs owned by the relationship hedge funds in the fund company at time t − 1
(Relationshipt−1), a dummy variable which is one if the fund company has more than one prime brokers and zero otherwise
(MultiPBst), the percentage of top ten prime brokers of the fund company (BigPBst), the quarterly net money flow of
fund company at time t − 1 (CFlowt−1), the hedge fund company’s return at time t − 1 (CReturnt−1), the asset under
management at time t− 1 (CAUMt−1), the average age of the managed hedge funds in the fund company at time t− 1
(Aget−1), and the standard deviation of the return of the fund company at time t − 1 (CReturnStdt−1). Column (1)
and (2) report the estimated coefficients using OLS regression and logit regression, respectively, with two-way clustered
standard errors. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. The last three rows report the number of observations,






























Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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CHAPTER 2
TRADING ON PRIVATE INFORMATION: EVIDENCE FROM
THE PRIME BROKERAGE AFFILIATED HEDGE FUNDS
2.1 Introduction
An important channel through which hedge funds earn abnormal returns is by trading
ahead of sell-side analyst recommendations. Studies have attributed this trading pattern be-
fore the public release of recommendations to the leakage of information on analysts’ reports.
For example, the institutional trades that anticipate changes to analyst recommendations
are shown to be consistent with institutional traders receiving tips on analysts’ reports (see
Irvine, Lipson, and Puckett (2007)). Klein, Saunders, and Wong (2014) and Swem (2014)
show that hedge funds trade profitably on analysts’ private information by buying before
upcoming upgrades and selling before upcoming downgrades, but no similar trading pattern
is found for other types institutional traders. In addition, Soltes (2014) and Solomon and
Soltes (2015) argue that hedge funds can gain information from the firm management in
conjunction with sell-side analysts in private meetings set up by investment bank.
Although information leakage may be the most plausible explanation for the trading
activities of hedge funds before the public release of analysts’ reports, little evidence has
been provided on the underlying motivation and the channel through which information
is leaked to hedge funds. According to Klein, Saunders, and Wong (2014), information
leakage related to analysts’ recommendations occurs between hedge funds and one or two
investment banks only. However, the economic incentives that motivate this relationship
are not examined. Why do investment banks reveal information or provide information-
acquisition opportunity to hedge funds? Why do investment banks favor hedge funds over
other investors by providing them profitable investment opportunities?
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This study examines whether investment banks are incentivized to provide hedge funds
with private information related to their sell-side analysts’ recommendations and thereby
provides evidence of information leakage. The growth of hedge funds and their demands
for investment banking services have produced massive flows of fees for investment banks
over the past few years. The business of prime brokerage is highly profitable to investment
banks. A 2011 report by Coalition Development Ltd claims that ten largest investment
banks earned about $10 billion from prime brokerage business in 2010, which is nearly com-
parable to the amount earned from their stock tradings1. Investment banks, acting as prime
brokers, provide a variety of services such as securities lending, margin financing, and settle-
ment facilities to hedge funds. In return, hedge funds boost revenues for investment banks
by paying prime brokerage fees on financing spread and trading commissions. Therefore,
investment banks need to obtain and retain hedge fund clients. Investment banks compete
aggressively for hedge fund clients by providing them with informational advantages or other
profitable investment opportunities (see Goldie (2011), Qian and Zhong (2014), Chuang and
Kang (2014), and Getmansky, Kazemi, and Yang (2014)).
Investment banks are motivated to share private information related to analysts’ reports
with hedge funds who use prime brokerage services from the investment banks. If information
on analysts’ reports leaks, advanced tradings are more likely to be observed with larger
magnitude for hedge funds that have prime brokerage affiliations with analysts’ employers
than for other hedge funds. Other hedge funds may nonetheless trade abnormally before the
report release, as experienced hedge funds may learn the related information by analyzing
market tradings, reading news, or using alternative information channels. Moreover, hedge
funds with short-term investment horizons are more likely to profit from the prime brokerage
relationships with analysts’ employers by taking advantage of private information and trading
on it.
1See “Morgan Stanley at Brink of Collapse Got $107 Billion From Fed, Bloomberg Business, Aug 2011”.
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Herein, I test the hypotheses of selective pre-release of analyst recommendations to the
affiliated hedge funds. I define affiliated hedge funds as hedge funds that use reporting ana-
lysts’ investment banks as their prime brokers. A recommendation is referred to as affiliated
if at least one affiliated hedge fund has positions in the covered stock. I hypothesize that
hedge funds that have prime brokerage affiliations with an analyst’s investment banks dis-
play superiority in anticipating that analyst’s recommendation. In particular, I test whether
tradings of affiliated hedge funds are more likely to vary with the forthcoming analysts’
recommendation changes than those of non-affiliated hedge? If hedge funds benefit from
investment banks’ information leakage, would the affiliated tradings lead to higher profits
than non-affiliated tradings?
Combining a comprehensive dataset of hedge funds and analyst recommendations with
SEC 13F fillings, I identify the affiliation of hedge funds with sell-side analysts through their
investment banks and quarterly equity holdings. Because the intra-quarter timing of hedge
fund trades are not available in 13F fillings, I am unable to identify hedge fund trading
patterns around the release of analysts’ recommendations. Following Klein, Saunders, and
Wong (2014), I address this limitation by lining up the recommendations issued up to two
trading days following calendar quarter-end dates. For example, suppose March 31 is the
quarter-end date reported by hedge funds in Form 13F, and then all recommendations on
the first or the second trading day after March 31 will be lined up with the first quarter
hedge fund holdings. I believe that hedge fund tradings one or two days before the public
release of analysts’ recommendations most likely reflect informed trading activities of hedge
funds2. The regression results bear out my anticipation of the timing of hedge fund trading
activities.
2Irvine, Lipson, and Puckett (2007) document abnormally high institutional trading volume in the period
beginning about five days before the public release of analysts’ recommendations. Klein, Saunders, and Wong
(2014) find that hedge fund stock tradings up to two days before the analysts’ reports are positively correlated
with analysts’ recommendation changes.
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My results support my hypotheses that prime brokerage affiliations motivate the leakage
of information on analysts’ recommendations and benefit hedge funds. First, I document
a positive association between changes in quarterly stock holdings of affiliated hedge funds
and changes in the subsequent analysts’ recommendations. I find that affiliated hedge funds
increase (or decrease) their stock holdings one or two days before the public release of upgrade
(or downgrade) recommendations3. I do not see the similar association for non-affiliated
hedge funds, and neither do I find significant change in hedge fund holdings more than
two days before the release of recommendations. These results are consistent with Klein,
Saunders, and Wong (2014) that hedge funds trade one to two days prior to recommendation
changes.
Second, I find that affiliated large hedge funds tend to buy upgrades and sell downgrades
in a larger magnitude compare to non-affiliated hedge funds before the public release of
recommendations. The results hold even if analysts do not correctly predict market reactions
for downgrade recommendations. In contrast, small hedge funds do not show similar trading
pattern difference between affiliated and non-affiliated groups, as small funds tend to generate
less prime brokerage fees, on average. Thus, investment banks are less incentivized to share
private information with small hedge funds. These results provide strong evidence that
affiliated hedge funds especially large ones trade advantageously over non-affiliated hedge
funds on forthcoming recommendations, suggesting that investment banks leak information
their prime brokerage hedge fund clients.
Third, I show that affiliated hedge funds, either large or small, are more likely to buy
upcoming upgrades and sell upcoming downgrades than non-affiliated hedge funds. For each
stock, I calculate net trading ratio, the probability that hedge funds trade in a way consistent
with upcoming recommendation changes. The net trading ratio is higher for affiliated hedge
funds than for non-affiliated hedge funds. The results suggest that, as investment banks
3An upgrade (downgrade) refers to a stock recommendation in which the analyst increases (decreases)
his buy/sell/hold recommendation rating for the stock.
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compete for prime brokerage business, information leakage is more pervasive among affiliated
hedge funds, even if they are small hedge funds.
Fourth, I present evidence that the prime brokerage affiliations with investment banks
affect hedge fund abnormal returns. Hedge funds cannot benefit from banks’ information
leakage if analysts’ recommendations have little impact on the stock price movements. I
show that affiliated hedge funds earn higher short-term abnormal returns by buying before
upgrades than do non-affiliated hedge funds; meanwhile, the prime brokerage affiliations with
analysts’ investment banks help hedge funds avoid negative or relatively low short-term ab-
normal returns induced by downgrade recommendations. These results suggest that affiliated
hedge funds are more likely to obtain profitable information on upcoming recommendations
from investment banks.
These results are robust to alternative explanations. In particular, I analyze the invest-
ment values of hedge funds by controlling for star analysts and influential recommendations.
I find that prime brokerage affiliations with analysts’ investment banks have positive impacts
on hedge funds’ abnormal returns no matter whether the analysts are star analysts or not.
Similar patterns of abnormal returns are observed for hedge funds that trade ahead of non-
influential recommendations. However, for influential recommendations, abnormal returns
are comparable across affiliated and non-affiliated hedge funds, suggesting that investment
banks tend to cater to their hedge fund clients in an inconspicuous way.
I also provide evidence that the relatively high abnormal returns earned by affiliated hedge
funds cannot be attributed to fund managers’ skills. Rather, it owes to investment banks
that add values to hedge funds by providing them with profitable investment opportunities.
Moreover, investment banks are more likely to show favoritism to the affiliated hedge funds
with higher skills, in expectation that they can earn more future rewards from the hedge
funds.
This study relates to three strands of literature. First, this study contributes to the lit-
erature by demonstrating the incentive and consequence of information leakage of analysts’
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reports. More important, I examine the incentives of investment banks to provide hedge
funds with information on analysts’ reports. Analysts may have strong incentives to leak
information because the relationships with institutional investors help their brokerage firms
generate additional commission revenue and thus make them receive higher compensation
(see Irvine (2004), Jackson (2005), Groysberg, Healy, and Maber (2011), Maber, Groysberg,
and Healy (2014)) or get job offers from prestigious investment banks (see Hong and Kubik
(2003), Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000)). Moreover, analysts rely on institutional in-
vestors to build career reputations, as institutional investors periodically evaluate analysts’
performance by electing All-America Research Team (see Leone and Wu (2007), Ljungqvist,
Marston, Starks, Wei, and Yan (2005)) or choosing which brokerage firms to use (see Maber,
Groysberg, and Healy (2014)). This paper complements the prior research by studying the
tipping behavior induced by prime brokerage business relationships between hedge funds
and investment banks, as prime brokerage fees are an important source of revenue earned
by investment banks.
Second, this paper contributes to the growing literature of leaking information on an-
alysts’ reports to institutional investors. Irvine, Lipson, and Puckett (2007) document an
increase in institutional tradings before the announcement of initial buy or strong buy rec-
ommendations. Correspondingly, Christophe, Ferri, and Hsieh (2010) show an abnormally
high level of short selling before downgrade recommendations. In both papers, either buying
or selling before recommendations presents evidence for potential information flows from
analysts to institutional investors. This paper is most closely related to Klein, Saunders,
and Wong (2014) and Swem (2014), which find a positive correlation between hedge fund
trading and the subsequent changes in analysts’ recommendations and no obviously similar
trading patterns for other institutional investors. However, these authors do not test the un-
derlying motives of information leakage, neither do they differentiate between investors that
have interest-driven relationships with analysts’ brokerage firms from those without such
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relationships. This paper complements and extends previous studies by comparing trading
behaviors of investors in different relationship groups.
Third, this paper provides strong support for the beneficial role of prime brokers in hedge
funds’ equity investments. Getmansky, Kazemi, and Yang (2014) find that investment banks
support hedge fund investments and growth by allocating underpriced IPOs, especially for
start-up hedge funds or poorly-performed hedge funds. Other related studies focus on the
information provision role of prime brokers. Qian and Zhong (2014) study hedge funds’ pos-
session of private information through post-IPO stock abnormal returns. They show that
connections between prime brokers and IPO underwriters are an important source of private
information for hedge funds. Goldie (2011) finds that risk arbitrage hedge funds are more
likely to invest in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) when hedge funds’ prime brokers also
work as advisors in the deals, and hedge funds outperform naive portfolios of risk arbitrage
investment by gaining information advantages through their connections with investment
banks. Chuang and Kang (2014) examine the comovement of hedge fund returns and ar-
gue that the strong comovement in hedge fund returns is induced by valuable information
provided by prime brokers. I find that information leakage of analysts’ recommendations
provide another channel that investment banks reward their hedge fund clients and boost
their competitiveness in the prime brokerage businesses.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the hypotheses
and my research design. Section 2.3 describes sample construction and presents summary
statistics. Section 2.4 presents methodologies and test results of comparing the trading
activities of affiliated and non-affiliated hedge funds. Section 2.5 shows the difference of
abnormal returns between affiliated and non-affiliated portfolios. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Hypotheses and research design
As investment banks are motivated to attract and retain hedge funds as clients, they
tend to reveal information or provide information-acquisition opportunity to their hedge
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fund clients. Thus, prime brokerage affiliation creates a potential channel for information
flows between investment banks and hedge funds. Based on my discussion thus far, I state
the hypotheses as follows.
Hypothesis 1: Hedge funds are more likely to acquire private information on upcoming
stock recommendations if they use prime brokerage services from the reporting analysts’
investment banks.
If analysts’ investment banks provide prime brokerage services to hedge funds, the trading
demands of hedge funds are predicted to be more likely to vary with upcoming recommen-
dations. Meanwhile, more hedge funds will buy stocks on upcoming upgrades and sell stocks
on upcoming downgrades if they use prime services from the analysts’ employers.
Hypothesis 2: Hedge funds are more likely to acquire profitable information on upcoming
stock recommendations if they use prime brokerage services from the reporting analysts’
investment banks.
If analysts’ investment banks provide prime brokerage services to hedge funds, the quality
of acquired information on forthcoming recommendations is expected to be higher. Thus,
hedge funds are more likely to receive accurate information on analysts’ reports, and their
investment values tend to be correlated with upcoming recommendation changes. Moreover,
as analysts cater to hedge funds by providing them with profitable investment opportunities,
the short-term investment values of affiliated tradings are expected to outperform those of
non-affiliated tradings.
To test these hypotheses, I model hedge funds’ information acquisition as trading in a
way consistent with upcoming recommendation changes shortly before the public release
of recommendations. I use Form 13F to identify hedge fund quarterly holdings, as well as
changes in stock holdings. Thus, I am able to determine hedge funds’ buying or selling
activities through the increase or decrease of their stock holdings over a particular quarter. I
associate hedge fund trading with analyst recommendations on the same stocks issued one or
two days subsequent to 13F filing date. I believe that buying or selling stocks immediately
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prior to recommendation release date will most likely capture the activities induced by
information flows from investment banks to hedge funds.
In order to separate the effect of each recommendation, I remove samples that associate
quarter-end hedge fund holdings with recommendations in both the following 1st and 2nd
day. I include yearly fixed effects to control for macroeconomic effects and cluster the
standard errors by hedge funds, investment banks, and stocks, respectively. The settings of
tests are not subject to earnings announcement drift.
2.3 Sample construction and summary statistics
I construct the sample by compiling a comprehensive dataset of hedge fund equity hold-
ings and analyst recommendations. The final samples include a universe of 176 hedge fund
management companies with 11 prime brokers and 750 recommendation changes with 550
sell-side analysts, spanning the period from 2003 to 2012.
2.3.1 Hedge fund sample
I use TASS database to identify all the hedge funds and hedge fund management compa-
nies. The TASS database is one of the most comprehensive hedge fund database consisting
of monthly hedge fund returns, asset under management (thereafter, AUM), and other fund-
specific information. More importantly, it provides information on prime brokers which is
useful in identifying the special association of hedge funds with investment banks.
I identify hedge fund equity holdings based on institutional holdings from 13F fillings to
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). As a private investment company, hedge funds
with more than $100 million under management must report their holdings to the SEC each
quarter on form 13F, including all long positions (but no short position) in U.S. stocks and
a few other securities greater than 10,000 shares or $200,000 in the market value. Holdings
are reported at the management company level at the end of each calendar quarter.
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Following the methodology of Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) and Griffin and Xu (2009),
I compile a list hedge fund management companies from TASS hedge fund databases,
and manually match them with the companies registered as investment advisers from 13F
database. If a firm is not registered, I include it in the sample, since registration is a pre-
requisite for conducting non-hedge fund business such as advising mutual funds and pension
plans. If the firm is registered, I obtain its ADV form and check its eligibility for the sample
based on two criteria: (1) at least 50% of its clients are Other pooled investment vehicles
(e.g., hedge funds)” or High net worth individuals,” and (2) it charges a performance fee
for its advisory services. This process leaves us with 380 companies and 25,633 total stock
holdings.
To identify hedge funds holdings in long positions, I focus solely on hedge funds using
long/short equity hedge, equity market neutral, Multi-Strategy, and event driven strategies.
I used data for both Live” and Graveyard” funds to mitigate a potential survivorship bias.
Since holdings data are company-based, I upgrade fund-level characteristics to the company-
level to satisfy the consistency requirements. For example, a hedge fund company’s asset
under management is calculated as the sum of AUMs of all hedge funds managed by the
company at each time point. I include only hedge funds that have at least $1 billion of assets
under management and have no less than 6 quarters of observations.
An important motive for using TASS is that it provides information on prime brokers
that a hedge fund requests services from. In recent years, the demand of hedge funds has
boosted the revenues of investment banks through their prime brokerage divisions. The core
services offered by a prime broker include execution and custody, margin financing, securities
lending, and consolidated reporting. As hedge funds continue to grow, prime brokers are
quickly expanding their businesses to include services such as risk management and capital
introduction.
In TASS, prime brokers are cross-sectionally identified at fund level, and a hedge fund
may be associated with one or more prime brokers. Since a management company often
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offers multiple hedge funds, I use all listed prime brokers within the same institution for a
hedge fund company. The unreported summary statistics of filtered TASS database consists
of 1,220 hedge fund companies and 343 prime brokers. The prime brokers are reported by
49% of hedge funds, among which about 17% declare to have multiple prime brokers. In the
sample, I excluded funds that did not report information on their prime brokers.
For most hedge funds, a prime brokerage, especially the division of a large investment
bank, is indispensable to the operation and ultimate success of their businesses. According
to the snapshots of TASS data from 2006 to 2012, the eleven major prime brokers ranked by
their average market share were Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, Credit Suisse,
Deutsche Bank, UBS, Citi, Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, Bank of America, and Merrill
Lynch. TASS lists 465 global prime brokers, with the 11 biggest prime brokers accounting
for about 86% of the market share in hedge fund businesses. Therefore, I include only these
11 largest prime brokers in this study.
I examine the prime broker turnover using yearly snapshots from 2006 to 2012. I do
not find significant changes of prime brokers for each hedge fund company and neither do
the changes of multiple prime brokers over these years. As the relationships between hedge
funds and prime brokers are relatively stable in this sample, I use prime broker data in 2006
snapshot for the time-series sample construction prior to 2006.
In additional to the hedge fund holdings, I also identify the holdings of other institutional
investors using the form 13F. The 13F institutions are classified into six types of institutional
investors: (1) Banks, (2) Insurance companies, (3) Investment companies (or mutual funds),
(4) Independent investment advisors, (5) Hedge funds, and (3) All others. I identify the
other institutional investors by combining all non-hedge fund categories into one group.
2.3.2 Analyst recommendation sample
I obtain stock recommendations data from Thomson Financial’s Institutional Brokers
Estimate (I/B/E/S) detail file, which identifies the names of analysts covering a given stock,
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the broker codes, the stock ratings, and the report date. I build the sample by searching for
stock ratings issued by individual analysts in particular brokerage firms from 2003 to 20124,
with ratings ranging from 1 (strong buy) to 5 (strong sell). I reverse the ratings (e.g. strong
buy now is denoted by 5 and strong sell now is denoted by 1) to allow higher ratings to
correspond to more favorable recommendations.
I focus on recommendation revisions rather than mere levels, since recommendation
changes are more informative on future stock values (see Jegadeesh and Kim (2009), Loh
and Stulz (2011)). The recommendation change (∆rec) is computed as the current rating
minus the prior rating by the same analyst, with the value ranging from -4 to +4. A recom-
mendation upgrade is defined as a positive recommendation change, and a recommendation
downgrade refers to negative recommendation change. I remove analysts coded as anony-
mous by I/B/E/S and lack of brokerage house information. I also remove observations for
which fewer than three analysts have active ratings. Each stock in the sample should have
at least one analyst who issues one recommendation and then another within 6 months.
I obtain analysts’ brokerage house information by mapping broker codes in the detail file
to names of brokers in the translation file5 . The translation file is no longer available in
I/B/E/S subsequent to 2005, but most of the broker codes are still being used by I/B/E/S.
Therefore, I use the latest version of the file associated with searching through LexisNexis,
Bloomberg, and Google to identify the brokerage house that the analysts work for after 2005.
I identify the affiliation of hedge funds with sell-side analysts by manually matching
analysts’ brokerage firms with the prime broker(s) that a hedge fund is associated with from
the TASS hedge fund database. The affiliated trading is then identified as a hedge fund’s
buying/selling a stock if the hedge fund is affiliated with a sell-side analyst’s investment
4Prior to the issuance of National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) rule 2110 in 2002, analysts
are compensated through their services to investment bank. As a result, member firms of analysts’ invest
bank may trade based on the pre-released analysts’ research reports. Therefore, rating samples before 2003
are likely to bias the test results for the affiliated trading.
5I am grateful to Alexander Ljungqvist for sharing the translation file with me.
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bank. The stock information including return, share price, and turnover are from Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP).
2.3.3 Summary statistics
Table 2.1 reports summary statistics of the samples from 2003 to 2012 with hedge fund
holdings lined up to two days before the release of recommendations. Panel A shows a
total of 3,698 cumulative stock recommendations in the sample, with 1,309 upgrades, 1,796
downgrades, and 593 no changes. Among these recommendations, approximately 47% are
one level changes, 36% are two level changes, and only less than 1% are three or four level
changes. Panel B shows the cumulative number of recommendation changes by years over
the sample period. On average, 370 recommendations change each year, with the number of
downgrades greater than that of upgrades and no changes. More firms receive upgrade and
downgrade recommendations in bull market than in bear market.
As Panel C shows, I capture the trading of 176 hedge funds in 750 recommendation
changes which are reported by 550 analysts from 11 investment banks. In order to examine
the impact of prime brokerage affiliations, I divide hedge fund trading into two groups:
affiliated and non-affiliated. Among the 3,698 hedge fund tradings, about 30% are affiliated
and 70% are non-affiliated. I further show the size effect of hedge funds on its tradings.
I refer to hedge funds with asset under management no less than $1 billion as large hedge
funds, and small hedge funds otherwise. For large hedge funds, which account for about 33%
total hedge funds in the sample, 31% of tradings are affiliated and 69% are non-affiliated.
The affiliated tradings of small hedge funds account for 42% of their total tradings, which is
relatively higher than that of large funds.
Panel C also show descriptive statistics for subsamples that will be used for robustness
tests in this study. I define Net-rec as hedge funds that trade in the same direction as
recommendation changes and Net-rec I as subsamples of Net-rec in which hedge fund tradings
have different signs than those of stock abnormal returns in the corresponding month. I show
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that, for affiliated hedge funds, approximately 37% of trading is in the same direction as
recommendation changes, among which 43% have different signs than those of the monthly
stock abnormal returns. For non-affiliated hedge funds, Net-rec and Net-rec I account for
40% and 18% total hedge fund tradings, respectively.
Panel D reports the characteristics of analysts, stocks, and hedge funds for the full
sample from the TASS hedge fund database matched with 13F institutional holding data and
I/B/E/S database from 2003 through 2012. The characteristics include analyst experience,
which is calculated as the number of years since an analyst issued the first recommendation on
I/B/E/S, coverage, which is the number of analysts that issued at least one recommendation
for a firm over a quarter, market value (in millions), quarterly stock return, quarterly stock
turnover, hedge fund AUM (in millions), which is calculated as the sum of AUMs of all hedge
funds managed by a company at a quarter, hedge fund quarterly return, which is calculated
as the percentage change of the net asset values of the fund company between the beginning
and the end of a quarter, and hedge fund age (in months), which is calculated as the asset
weighted average age of the managed hedge funds. All these variables are used as control
variables in regression analyses in section 4.3.
2.4 Affiliation and information acquisition
I begin the analysis by comparing the trading patterns of affiliated hedge funds with non-
affiliated hedge funds. I also examine how hedge fund tradings relative to other institutional
investors vary with the changes of information. Then I use regression analyses to test whether
prime brokerage affiliations impact information acquisition of hedge funds.
2.4.1 Hedge fund trading measures
I use three measures to evaluate trading activities of hedge funds prior to the release of
analysts’ recommendations based on the Form 13F. The first measure is the holdings change
(∆sharesj,i,t) of a hedge fund j, which is defined as the change in the number of shares held
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by the hedge fund in stock i during quarter t. The holdings change represents hedge fund’s
net buys or net sales of a particular stock over a quarter, which directly reflect the trading
activities of hedge funds before the release of recommendations.
∆sharesj,i,t = sharesj,i,t − sharesj,i,t−1 (2.1)
Presumably both hedge funds’ buying and selling activities and analysts’ recommendation
changes are based on the anticipated stock market value. For example, hedge funds may buy
more stocks with lower price and purchase fewer stocks that are more expensive. As a result,
holding quantity based measure may bias the tests of information leakage to hedge funds.
Therefore, as an alternative to holdings change, I define net trading value ($∆sharesj,i,t) as
the dollar turnover of hedge fund j’s holdings in stock i over quarter t.
$∆sharesj,i,t = (sharesj,i,t − sharesj,i,t−1) ∗ pi,t (2.2)
where ∆pi,t = pi,t−pi,t−1, and pi,t and pi,t−1 is the share price of stock i at the end of quarter
t and t − 1, respectively. This measure is designed to control for the impact of level and
movement of stock price on hedge fund trading.
The last measure is used to examine the likelihood of informed trading of hedge funds
prior to recommendation changes. I introduce the net trading ratio (NTRi,t), which is cal-
culated as the number of hedge funds js that trade in the same direction as recommendation
change released on day d (d > t) on stock i scaled by the total number of hedge funds in the










Different than the previous two measures, the net trading ratio is calculated on the stock
level. If the direction of a hedge fund’s trading is consistent with a recommendation change,
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the hedge fund might have acquired information on the analyst’s report. If not, the hedge
fund either did not receive information or traded with its own skill. To the extent that
trading ahead explains information leakage, the net trading ratio measures the probability
of information-induced trading of hedge funds, and the higher ratio indicates the higher
probability of information leakage.
To examine information-induced trading, I categorize all hedge fund samples into two
groups: affiliated and non-affiliated, and further divide each group into large and small
hedge funds. Investment banks are more likely to cater to hedge funds that are their business
clients, considering massive prime brokerage fees earned from these high net-worth investors.
In addition, investment banks prefer to serve large-size hedge funds, as they possess a large
amount of capitals and are expected to pay higher fees on financing spread and trading
commissions. Therefore, considering the impact of fund size on banks’ payback, I partition
hedge funds into large and small funds based on their assets under management, with a
threshold of $1 billion. If information leakage occurs, affiliated large hedge funds are expected
to display superiority in pre-release trading relative to other funds.
Table 2.2 and Figure 3.1 presents statistical analysis for the trading of affiliated and non-
affiliated hedge funds prior to the release of recommendations. I separately test the trading
of large and small hedge funds in upgrade and downgrade recommendations using three
measures. Table 2.2 Panel A presents results for upgrade recommendations. The means
and medians of the three measures are all positive for both large and small funds. For the
affiliated large hedge funds, the average increments of share holdings and net trading values
prior to the recommendation release are significantly greater than those of non-affiliated
large hedge funds and small hedge funds. In contrast, small hedge funds do not show similar
trading pattern differences between the affiliated and non-affiliated groups. In terms of the
net trading ratio, affiliated hedge funds show significant advantages over non-affiliated funds,
either large or small funds, in buying upcoming upgrades beforehand. I do not observe
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obvious difference of net trading ratios between large and small hedge funds with prime
brokerage affiliations.
For downgrade recommendations, as shown in Table 2.2 Panel B, the average share
holdings and net trading values still increase over a quarter prior to the recommendation
release. However, the magnitudes of increments for affiliated large funds are significantly
smaller than those of non-affiliated large hedge funds and small hedge funds. In addition, the
average net trading ratio of selling upcoming downgrades is significantly higher for affiliated
hedge funds than for non-affiliated funds. The average net trading ratio of selling downgrades
is comparable across large and small hedge funds.
These results provide evidence that affiliated hedge funds especially large ones trade
advantageously compared to non-affiliated hedge funds on forthcoming recommendations.
Specifically, affiliated large hedge funds tend to buy more upgrades and sell more (or buy
less) downgrades prior to the release of recommendations than do non-affiliated hedge funds.
The results suggest the existence of information leakage on analysts’ recommendations due
to prime brokerage business relationships. I also find that, consistent with the profit-driven
nature of the banking business, the magnitude of information leakage is positively related
to fund size, as investment banks earn higher prime brokerage fees from large hedge funds.
Small hedge funds may also acquire private information from investment bank, as their prime
brokerage affiliations are associated with a higher likelihood of information-induced trading.
2.4.2 Information acquisition and trading demand
I further examine how hedge fund tradings vary with the change of information under
the impact of prime brokerage affiliations. According to Kacperczyk and Seru (2007), if
investors receive more precise private information before the release of a recommendation,
they are more sensitive to information than less-informed investors and trade advantageously
on it. As information goes from private to public, demands of less-informed investors are
more responsive to public information than those of informed investors. Thus, less-informed
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investors tend to boost (or cut) their holdings relative to informed investors after upgrade (or
downgrade) recommendations are released. Based on this, I ask whether hedge funds show a
similar trading pattern, and whether prime brokerage affiliation is an important determinant
of this pattern?
Tests are based on the noisy Rational Expectations Equilibrium model of Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980), which argues that as the quality of informed traders’ information increase,
the more their demands will vary with the information. In this paper, the premise of the
argument is that prime brokerage affiliations with analysts’ investment banks lead to more
precised private signals received by hedge funds. Given this premise, if hedge funds receive
prime brokerage services from analysts’ investment banks, their aggregate demands for the
forthcoming recommendations will change more with the change of information than will
those of non-affiliated funds.
I estimate relative trading demands of affiliated and non-affiliated hedge funds and test
their difference prior to and after the release of recommendations. Relative trading demand is
defined as the trading demand of hedge funds relative to that of other institutional investors.
For each recommendation change, trading demand is calculated as the percentage changes
of aggregate stock holdings in a quarter. I use the demand of other institutional investors
as a benchmark in order to control for factors unrelated to information leakage6.
In the unreported tests, trading demands are asymmetrically distributed, with the value
spans from -0.42 to 7.502 for hedge funds and from -0.098 to 0.307 for other institutional
investors. For large hedge funds, the average pre-release demand for upgrades is significantly
greater than that of other large institutional investors, either affiliated or non-affiliated. I do
not observe a particular pattern for small hedge funds and for the post-release trading. These
results indicate that, relative to hedge funds, other institutional investors are uninformed of
6According to Klein, Saunders, and Wong (2014) and Swem (2014), other institutional investors do
not show similar pre-recommendation trading patterns of buying upgrades and selling downgrades as hedge
funds, suggesting that other institutional investors are uninformed relative to hedge funds.
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the upcoming analyst reports. Hedge funds trade actively in certain stocks and are among
the most important players in equity market.
Table 2.3 presents the statistical analyses of relative trading demand of affiliated and non-
affiliated hedge funds prior to (pre) and after (post) the release of analyst recommendations.
I value-weight investors’ demand for each stock by dividing investors’ holding values in a
stock with their holding values in all stocks in a quarter. I test the mean and median
difference of pre-release and post-release relative demand for the two groups of hedge funds
using a paired t-test and Wilcoxon rank-sum test. I separately show the results for large and
small hedge funds, as well as the mean trading demand of other large and small institutional
investors.
Panel A shows that, for upgrade recommendations, the pre-release relative trading de-
mand of large hedge funds, either affiliated or non-affiliated, are significantly higher than
their post-release relative demand. Two sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test shows that the av-
erage pre-release relative demand of affiliated large hedge funds is significantly greater than
that of non-affiliated funds, whereas post-release tradings do not show a similar pattern.
For the affiliated large hedge funds, the average variation of relative demand from pre- to
post-release is 1.362, which is greater than 0.920 for the non-affiliated large hedge funds at
5% significance level. I do not observe similar demand patterns for the small hedge funds.
These results provide evidence that large hedge funds especially affiliated ones tend to buy
pre-release upgrades and reverse the trades after the release of recommendations.
Panel B presents the statistical analysis of relative trading demand around downgrade
recommendations. The paired t-test results are not quite straightforward, as the potential
decreases in demands are balanced out by big trades of large hedge funds. Nonetheless, I find
that, for the affiliated large funds, the median relative demand is negative, suggesting that
the probability that hedge funds sell more (or buy less) pre-release downgrades than other
institutional investors are above fifty percent. Moreover, unlike non-affiliated hedge funds,
the average pre-release relative trading demand of affiliated hedge funds is not significantly
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higher than post-release relative demand, which is consistent with the test results for upgrade
recommendations.
In sum, the analyses of relative trading demand in Table 2.3 provides support for the
hypothesis, as affiliated hedge funds have a higher (or lower) pre-release trading demand
for upgrades (or downgrades) than non-affiliated funds. More important, consistent with
Kacperczyk and Seru (2007), the results suggest that affiliated hedge funds are sensitive
to private information prior to the recommendation release and are less likely to rely on
public information in the post-recommendation tradings than are non-affiliated hedge funds.
These results illustrate the importance of prime brokerage affiliations on the information
acquisition of hedge funds.
2.4.3 Regression analysis of pre-release hedge fund trading
To test whether hedge funds that have prime brokerage affiliations with analysts’ invest-
ment banks are more likely to obtain private information on analysts’ reports, I start by
examining the timing of hedge fund trading prior to recommendation changes. I include
additional 22,109 recommendation change samples, which are issued up to 10 trading days
following the Form 13F quarter-end date. I line up these recommendation changes with
hedge fund quarterly holdings from the Form 13F. The total samples for the timing test
consist of 62 large hedge funds and 133 small hedge funds associated with 7,917 affiliated
tradings and 17,890 non-affiliated tradings.
Following Klein, Saunders, and Wong (2014), I form 10 portfolios by assigning each
recommendation change to a portfolio based on k days between the Form 13F quarter-
end date t and the release date of recommendation d. I run the regression ∆sharej,i,t =
αk + βk∆reci,d + εi,k, where ∆sharej,i,t is the change in the number of shares held by hedge
fund j in stock i during quarter t, and ∆reci,d is the change of an analyst’s recommendation
for stock i issued on day d (d = t+k, k = 1, 2, ..., 10 day(s)). Yearly fixed effects are included,
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and standard errors are clustered by hedge funds and investment banks. The estimated βk
infers whether hedge funds trade k day(s) prior to recommendation release.
Table 2.4 reports results for the estimated βk for each portfolio, with the last row shows
results for the aggregated 5 portfolios from day d = t + 6 to t + 10. I separately estimate
βk for the affiliated and non-affiliated hedge funds. The results show that only β1 and β2
for affiliated hedge funds are positive and significant, and βk from d = 3 to d = 10 are
insignificant for any group of hedge funds. Consistent with Irvine, Lipson, and Puckett
(2007) and Klein, Saunders, and Wong (2014), these results provide evidence that affiliated
large hedge funds trade one or two days prior to recommendation changes, suggesting the
existence of information leakage of analysts’ recommendation. Therefore, in order to examine
the effect of prime brokerage affiliations on hedge fund trading, I focus on recommendations
issued up to two trading days following the Form 13F quarter-end date throughout the rest
of this paper.
I then perform three sets of multivariate regressions on hedge fund tradings, which are
measured using ∆shares, $∆shares, and NTR, respectively, to examine trading activities of
individual hedge funds prior to recommendation changes. As discussed above, hedge funds
are categorized into four groups: affiliated large, non-affiliated large, affiliated small, and
non-affiliated small, and I generate a corresponding dummy variable for each group: AL,
NAL, AS, and NAS. I use the non-affiliated small group as a base group and include
the other three dummy variables along with their interactions with ∆rec in the regression.
I include a vector of variables for stocks, analysts, and hedge funds to control for factors
influencing hedge fund tradings. Analyst experience (Ana exp), which is calculated as the
number of years since an analyst issued the first recommendation on I/B/E/S, controls for
the effect of analyst experience on hedge fund tradings. Analyst coverage (Coverage), which
is the number of analysts that issued at least one recommendation for a firm over a quarter,
captures the impact of analyst opinions on fund tradings. The logarithm of stock market
value (Ln MV ) from the previous year, stock return (Stk return) over previous quarter, and
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stock turnover (Stk turnover) over previous quarter are used to control for the effect of firm
size, stock return and turnover on fund tradings, respectively. HF flow is the quarterly flow
of a hedge fund company, calculated as the percentage change of AUMs of a fund company
between the beginning and the end of a quarter. Hedge fund return (HF return), which
is calculated as the percentage change of net asset values of a fund company between the
beginning and the end of the previous quarter, controls for fund performance effect. Hedge
fund age (HF age), which is calculated as the asset weighted average age (in months) of the
managed hedge funds, controls for the fund age effect.
Table 2.5 reports test results of pre-release hedge fund tradings measured by ∆shares
and $∆shares. Panel A shows the regression analysis for all hedge funds, Panel B presents
the results of equality tests for the differences between regression coefficients in different
groups, and Panel C, D, and E present the regression results for large hedge funds only.
I include yearly fixed effect in the regressions, and standard errors are clustered by hedge
funds and investment banks.
Panel A shows regression results for total recommendation changes, as well as non-
negative and non-positive recommendation changes. In all models, the coefficients on in-
teraction terms of ∆rec and AL are positive and significant, indicating that affiliated large
hedge funds tend to buy more shares for bigger upcoming upgrades and sell more shares
for bigger upcoming downgrades. This result suggests that tradings of affiliated large hedge
funds are positively associated with the forthcoming recommendation changes with the mag-
nitude greater than that of the base group. The coefficients on ∆rec and ∆rec×NAL are
not significant and are even significantly negative on ∆rec × AS for the total and non-
positive recommendation change samples, suggesting that the tradings of small hedge funds
and non-affiliated hedge funds are inconsistent with the upcoming recommendation changes.
I also compare the trading behavior of three non-base groups by testing the differences
of regression coefficients. Panel B presents F-stats of the equality tests between coefficients
on three interaction variables. For the regressions of both ∆shares and $∆shares, the
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coefficients of ∆rec×AL are significantly bigger than those of ∆rec×NAL and ∆rec×AS,
suggesting that affiliated large hedge funds are more likely to buy upcoming upgrades and
sell upcoming downgrades in a larger magnitude compared to other hedge funds. These
results provide evidences on the information leakage hypothesis that affiliated large hedge
funds are more likely to acquire private information on upcoming stock recommendations.
I perform the robustness tests by undertaking regression analyses for large hedge funds
only. If information leakage is present, affiliated large hedge funds are expected to buy
upgrades and sell downgrades prior to the release of reports even if analysts do not correctly
predict market reactions. Thus, I define Net-rec as hedge funds that trade in the same
direction as upcoming recommendation changes and Net-rec I as subsamples of Net-rec in
which hedge fund tradings have different signs than those of stock abnormal returns in the
corresponding month. The monthly stock abnormal returns are estimated from the Fama-
French-Carhart (see Carhart, 1997) four-factor model7.
Panel C, D, and E in Table 2.5 present the regression results of upgrades & downgrades
respectively, and for the total samples of large hedge funds, Net-rec, and Net-rec I, separately.
For the regressions of both ∆shares and $∆shares, the coefficients on ∆rec×AL are positive
and significant for the total samples and for the Net-rec samples in upgrades & downgrades.
These results are consistent with the previous test results. More importantly, the results
provide strong evidence that affiliated large hedge funds are privately informed on analysts’
recommendations and they trade ahead by taking advantage of it.
As a result of robustness check, the coefficients on ∆rec×AL for Net-rec I in the regres-
sions of both ∆shares and $∆shares are significant and positive in the downgrades samples
in Panel E. The results provide evidence that hedge funds are likely to sell prior to the
release of downgrade recommendations, even if the expected stock price downward heading
does not occur. However, for upgraded stocks with negative post-event abnormal returns, I
7I am grateful to Kenneth French for making the data on the four factors available for download from
his website at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.
62
do not find the similar trading patterns. A potential explanation is that analysts are more
likely to tip off hedge funds on the upcoming downgrade recommendations than on upgrade
recommendations. According to Barber et al. (2005), analysts are reluctant to downgrade
stocks that are predicted to have dimming prospects. With a downgrade recommendation,
the subsequent stock price is more likely to head downward, relative to the chances of head-
ing upward after a upgrade recommendation. Therefore, private information on downgrades
is more valuable than that on upgrades for hedge funds with prime brokerage affiliations.
Another possible reason is that investors are downside risk averse. If information uncer-
tainty is high, hedge funds would rely more on its own skills or other information sources
than purely on private information from analysts to trade stocks with bright prospects. How-
ever, for the expected downgraded stocks, affiliated hedge funds tend to put more weight on
analysts’ opinions and reduce their shares holding more than they should have done based
on the acquired information. As a result, the difference of trading sensitivity to downgrade
information between affiliated and non-affiliated hedge funds become larger, compared to
funds’ reactions to upgrade information. In addition, information leakage of downgrade
recommendations may lead to greater short selling of hedge funds with prime brokerage
affiliations, which is beyond the discussion of this paper and requires further data supports.
To examine the pervasiveness of information leakage, I further perform stock-level re-
gression analyses of the pre-release hedge fund trading measured by the net trading ratio
(NTR).
NTRi,t = αd + β1d∆reci,d + β2dARi,d + β3d∆reci,d × ARi,d + γdXi,t−1 + εi,d (2.4)
where ∆reci,d is the change of an analyst’s recommendation for stock i issued on day d, which
is one or two trading days following the Form 13F report date t (d = t+ 1 or t+ 2), ARi,d is
a dummy variable indicating whether the recommendation is affiliated, that is, whether at
least one affiliated hedge fund has positions in the stock i, ∆reci,d × ARi,d is an interaction
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variable of ∆reci,d and ARi,d, and Xi,t−1 is a vector of control variables for analysts and stocks
in quarter t− 1, including Ana exp, Coverage, Ln MV , Stk return, and Stk turnover.
I separately compute NTR for large hedge funds and small hedge funds, denoted as
NTR L and NTR S, respectively, and estimate a system of two equations simultaneously
using seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR). I do not use independent ordinary least squares
(OLS) estimation for the two equations because the error terms in the two models are
correlated, and using a joint estimation than OLS is more efficient.
Table 2.6 reports the results of SUR tests, with Panel A presents the regression analysis
for upgrades and downgrades and Panel B presents the results of equality tests for the coef-
ficient differences between large and small hedge funds. As Panel A shows, in both models,
the coefficients on ∆rec and ∆rec × AR are significantly positive for upgrade recommen-
dations and significantly negative for downgrade recommendations. These results provide
evidence that larger upgrade (or downgrade) recommendations are associated with higher
percentages of stock purchase (or selling) by hedge funds, either affiliated or non-affiliated.
More importantly, I find that affiliated hedge funds have a significantly higher probability to
trade in a way that is consistent with upcoming recommendation changes than non-affiliated
hedge funds. The results suggest the existence of information leakage from investment banks
to affiliated hedge funds.
These results hold even for small hedge funds, indicating that not merely large hedge
funds but small hedge funds acquire more or less information on analysts’ recommendations.
There might be other channels through which hedge funds obtain private information on
stock trading, however, the positive coefficients on ∆rec × AR suggest that small hedge
funds are also tipped by investment banks. Based on this, I further examine the extent to
which small hedge funds differ from large hedge funds in information acquisition by testing
the differences of regression coefficients between large and small hedge funds. The Chi-
square test results are presented in Table 2.6 Panel B. The results show that, for upgrade
recommendations, the coefficient on ∆rec × AR for large hedge funds is higher than that
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for small hedge funds at a 1% significance level, whereas no similar pattern is observed for
downgrade recommendations. These results suggest that affiliated large hedge funds are
more likely to acquire private information on upcoming upgrades than small hedge funds,
but for downgrade recommendations, the chances of being tipped off are alike between large
and small hedge funds.
In summary, the results suggest that the prime brokerage affiliations of hedge funds with
analysts’ investment banks contribute positively to the trading of hedge funds in relation to
recommendation changes. Moreover, it shows that affiliated hedge funds are more likely to
buy stocks on upcoming upgrades or sell stocks on upcoming downgrades. Assuming that
the coefficients on the interaction of recommendation changes and affiliations proxy for the
information leakage, the results support the hypothesis that hedge funds are more likely
to acquire private information on forthcoming stock recommendations if they have prime
brokerage relationships with analysts’ investment banks.
2.5 Affiliations and abnormal returns
In this section, I compare the post-recommendation abnormal returns earned by affiliated
and non-affiliated hedge funds. I then do the robustness check by testing whether the
abnormal returns are determined by the characteristics of recommendations, analysts, or
fund managers.
2.5.1 Abnormal returns: affiliated vs. non-affiliated hedge funds
If investment banks compete for prime brokerage businesses, I would expect that trading
based on banks’ private information leads to higher profits for affiliated hedge fund clients.
In order to evaluate the investment values of informed trading, I focus on net-rec tradings.
I define net-rec tradings as hedge fund tradings that are in the same direction as the subse-
quent recommendation changes. I include only hedge funds with stock holdings increased (or
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decrease) one or two days before the public release of upgrade (or downgrade) recommenda-
tions. The analyses are performed separately for upgrade and downgrade recommendations.
I partition the stocks held by affiliated and non-affiliated hedge funds and received rec-
ommendations from analysts into two portfolios, with each portfolio weighted by the dollar
value of stock holdings of each hedge fund. The portfolios are rebalanced at the end of
every quarter so that the latest fund trades are included in the portfolios at each point in
time. Over the sample period, 362 tradings for upgrades and 441 tradings for downgrades
are classified in the affiliated group, and 947 tradings for upgrades and 1355 tradings for
downgrades are classified in the non-affiliated group, respectively.
To evaluate variations in returns earned by hedge funds, I compute the abnormal return
of a stock as the difference between the stock return and the return of one of the 125
benchmark portfolios that have comparable characteristics in size, book-to-market ratio, and
past stock returns (Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers 1997, thereafter DGTW8). The
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of each stock held by a hedge fund are then calculated
based on d days (d=2, 30, 60, 90, 120, 150, 180, 270, and 360 days) trading windows after
the recommendation release date.
Table 2.7 and Figure 2.3 present post-recommendation cumulative abnormal returns of
the affiliated and non-affiliated portfolios. The average cumulative abnormal returns in d
days (d=2, 30, 60, 90, 120, 150, 180, 270, and 360 days) after the recommendation release
date are reported for upgrades and downgrades, respectively. In Table 2.7 Panel A, the
average CARs in all time windows subsequent to upgrades are significantly positive for the
affiliated portfolios, with the highest 360-day average CAR of 0.0718 and the lowest 30-
day average CAR of 0.0082. However, only the 2-day average CAR for the non-affiliated
portfolios is positive. Except for the 30-day window, the average post-upgrades CARs in all
time windows of the affiliated portfolios are higher than those of the non-affiliated portfolios
8The DGTW benchmarks are available via http://www.smith.umd.edu/faculty/rwermers/ftpsite/
Dgtw/coverpage.htm
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at the 1% significance level. The test results suggest that affiliated hedge funds earn higher
post-event short-term abnormal returns by buying prior to upgrades than do non-affiliated
hedge funds.
Table 2.7 Panel B presents the analyses of post-downgrades average CARs of the affiliated
and non-affiliated portfolios. From the 2-day to 120-day time windows, the average CARs of
the affiliated portfolios are significantly lower than those of the non-affiliated portfolios at a
1% level, suggesting that the prime brokerage affiliations help hedge funds avoid negative or
relatively low abnormal returns induced by the release of downgrade recommendations. For
the remaining time windows, the average CARs of the affiliated portfolio show a growing
pattern relative to those of the non-affiliated portfolio. These results suggest the potential
profitable opportunities for the reverse tradings of hedge funds after downgrades.
I further analyze the short-term abnormal returns earned by hedge funds through in-
formed trading based on two characteristics. The first is the reputation of the analysts
issuing recommendations. A star is defined as any analyst that ranked as an All-American
(first, second, third, or runner-up teams) in the annual polls in the Institutional Investor
magazine. The star characteristics indicate that an analyst has a high reputation relative to
others, and a recommendation issued by the star analyst could cause extensive attention in
the market.
The second characteristic is the influence of recommendation changes on stock price.
A recommendation change is influential if it has a significant impact on the stock price
of the covered firm, as many investors adjust their holdings to the information produced
by analysts. Based on Loh and Stulz (2011), I identify an influential recommendation by
checking if the two-day CAR is in the same direction as the recommendation change and the
absolute value of CAR exceeds 1.96×
√
2×σε, where σε is the standard deviation of residuals
from a daily time-series regression of past three-month stock returns against market returns
and the Fama-French factors SMB and HML. The purpose of characteristics-based analyses
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is to examine the impact of prime brokerage affiliations on the abnormal returns earned by
hedge funds after controlling for analyst- and recommendation-level factors.
Panel A and B in Table 2.8 provide the analyses of characteristics-based average CARs
of affiliated and non-affiliated portfolios over 2 days, 30 days, 60 days, and 90 days. In the
sample from 2003-2012, 8.75% of hedge fund tradings are in recommendations issued by star
analysts and 17% in influential recommendations. From recommendations issued by both
stars and by non-stars, the affiliated portfolios earn significantly higher average CARs and
avoid significantly lower average CARs in 2-day, 60-day, and 90-day time windows than the
non-affiliated portfolios9. The results suggest that prime brokerage affiliations with analysts’
investment banks have positive impact on hedge funds’ abnormal returns no matter whether
the analysts are star analysts or not. A potential explanation is that analysts tend to show
their favoritism to hedge funds, as hedge funds with affiliations are either important to their
brokerage firms or important to their own compensation and future career10.
In contrast, abnormal returns earned from influential and non-influential recommenda-
tions tend to differ. Relative to non-affiliated hedge funds, affiliated hedge funds earn sig-
nificantly higher average CARs and avoid significantly lower average CARs in most time
windows by trading prior to non-influential recommendations. However, the average CARs
earned or avoided from influential recommendations appear to be comparable across two
portfolios, especially for upgrades. A potential explanation is that information leakage is
less likely to occur among influential recommendations as analysts tend to hide their cater-
ing behavior in the non-influential recommendations.
In summary, the above analyses suggest that affiliated hedge funds earn higher post-
recommendation abnormal returns by buying prior to upgrades and avoid lower post-recommendation
9All upgraded recommendations issued by star analysts in the sample are in the affiliated portfolio,
which indirectly provides evidence that affiliated hedge funds earn higher short-term abnormal returns than
non-affiliated hedge funds (see Loh and Stulz (2011))
10Concerned about their compensation and career prospects, analysts are motivated to leak private in-
formation to their hedge fund clients as they attempt to win broker votes (see Maber (2014)) or the votes
for All-America analysts from hedge funds.
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abnormal returns by selling prior to downgrades than do non-affiliated hedge funds. Test
results are consistent with the hypothesis that hedge funds with prime brokerage affiliations
with analysts’ employer are more likely to acquire profitable information on future stock
recommendations from the analysts. Investment banks play an important role in providing
profitable opportunities for hedge funds to buy (or sell) prior to upgrades (or downgrades)
even after controlling for star analysts and influential recommendations.
2.5.2 Affiliations or skills?
I check the robustness of the results by testing whether affiliated hedge funds are more
likely to invest in stocks that analysts issue profitable recommendations. If affiliated hedge
funds have better stock picking and timing skills, would information be transmitted the other
way around from hedge funds to analysts? Specifically, I examine whether the relatively
high abnormal returns earned by affiliated hedge funds are determined by managers’ skills
in getting information from sources other than investment banks.
I examine hedge fund managers’ skills based on fund alphas and compare them across
the affiliated and non-affiliated portfolios. I estimate alpha of an individual hedge fund by
adopting a rolling-window method to regress the net-of-fee monthly excess return (in excess
of risk-free rate) of each hedge fund on the seven factors constructed by Fung and Hsieh
(2004). The seven factors include the S&P 500 monthly return minus risk free rate, Russell
2000 index monthly return minus S&P 500 monthly return, change in the 10-year treasury
constant maturity yield, change in the Moody’s Baa yield less 10-year treasury constant
maturity yield, the return of bond primitive trend-following strategy, the return of currency
primitive trend following strategy, and the return of commodity primitive trend-following
strategy. Following Naik, Ramadorai, and Stromqvist (2007), for each month, I calculate a
fund’s factor loadings of the seven factors using the previous 24 months of data, and obtain
the risk-adjusted return as the fund’s alpha. A fund company’s alpha is calculated as the
average alphas of the managed hedge funds in the same company.
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In the unreported results, the average alpha is 1.33% for large hedge funds and 1.11%
for small hedge funds. The alphas are comparable across affiliated and non-affiliated hedge
funds, either large or small, suggesting that affiliated hedge funds are not more skillful in
equity tradings than non-affiliated hedge funds.
Table 2.9 presents the analyses of post-recommendation cumulative abnormal returns of
affiliated and non-affiliated portfolios by controlling for managers’ alphas. I separately sort
large and small hedge funds into three terciles based on fund’s alpha in a quarter, with the
top and bottom terciles defined as high alpha and low alpha hedge funds, respectively. I test
the differences of CARs over 2-day, 30-day, 60-day, and 90-day windows between affiliated
and non-affiliated portfolios for the high alpha and low alpha hedge funds, respectively. If the
affiliated and non-affiliated hedge funds with comparable skills show differences in abnormal
returns, the disparities are likely to be from the ”hidden” skills or affiliation-driven skills of
hedge funds.
I find that, in the high alpha hedge fund group, the post-upgrade (or post-downgrade)
CARs of affiliated portfolio are significantly higher (or lower) than those of non-affiliated
portfolio in most of the reported time windows. However, the similar difference pattern only
exists in the 2-day window in the low alpha group. The results of robustness tests support
the hypotheses after controlling for hedge fund managers’ skills. Hedge funds benefit from
the prime brokerage affiliations with analysts’ investment banks by investing in stocks that
analysts issue profitable recommendations.
I also find that, only in the affiliated portfolios, the highly-skilled hedge funds display
superiority in earning higher post-upgrade abnormal returns or avoid lower post-downgrade
abnormal returns, relative to the less-skilled hedge funds. These results indicate that hedge
fund skills in stock investments can be realized only in an informed environment, and private
information plays an important role in making difference in the equity trading skills of hedge
funds. These results also suggest that investment banks tend to cater to hedge funds with
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high skills by providing them with more profitable opportunities, in expectation of higher
rewards in the future.
2.5.3 Hedge fund risk exposure
So far I have shown the beneficial impact of investment banks on hedge fund equity in-
vestments by examining the short-term stock abnormal returns. A concern I address here
is the extent to which values are added to hedge funds through informed tradings. Sharpe
(1992) shows that an asset class factor model can be used to determine how effectively in-
dividual fund managers have allocated the overall assets and achieved performance target
through active management. The funds’ risk/reward characteristics can be captured by tak-
ing on risk exposures on certain factors, with the weights estimated by regressing individual
fund returns on the risk factors (Hasanhodzica and Lo (2006)). Accordingly, I use a linear
factor model to examine the exposure of hedge fund returns to recommendation changes.
If hedge funds with prime brokerage affiliations have priority in acquiring information on
analysts’ recommendations, I anticipate that these hedge funds have higher exposure to the
stock recommendation changes with large market reactions.
I perform the analysis by constructing recommendation factors for hedge funds and exam-
ining the allocation of hedge funds’ portfolios among recommendation-oriented asset classes.
I focus on hedge funds that earn immediate positive two-day abnormal returns by buying
upgrades and avoid immediate negative two-day abnormal returns by selling downgrades
prior to the recommendation release. For a hedge fund, the immediate profits earned (or
the losses avoided) in each share of stock is the two-day CAR (or -CAR) of an analyst rec-
ommendation. I use the earned profits to denote the immediate positive profits earned and
the immediate negative losses avoided by hedge funds in the following text. To compare the
investment values of affiliated and non-affiliated hedge funds effectively, I choose 3 stocks
with the highest earned profits out of those invested by affiliated hedge funds and 3 stocks
with the highest earned profits out of those invested by non-affiliated hedge funds. I put
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each stock into one of the six barrels that belong to two different groups and rank the stocks
by earned profits from high to low in each group. I refer to the time-series stock returns in
each barrel as a recommendation factor.
I perform a time-series regression of hedge funds’ monthly returns on the recommendation








+ δ1MKTt + δ2SMBt + δ3HMLt + δ4MOMt + εit (2.5)
where A. RecFactorkt is the recommendation factor k in the affiliated group in month t,
NA. RecFactorkt is the recommendation factor k in the non-affiliated group in month t,
Rit is the return of hedge fund i in month t, and MKTt, SMBt, HMLt, and MOMt
are the Fama-French-Carhart four factors, respectively. βik and γik are factor loadings on
recommendation factor k in the affiliated and non-affiliated groups, respectively, which reflect
the extent to which hedge fund returns are exposed to the recommendation changes.
Table 2.10 shows the analyses of hedge funds’ exposure to analysts’ recommendation
changes. The results are presented separately for large and small hedge funds. From k = 1
to 3, the mean and median factor loadings βiks in the affiliated groups, either large or small,
are larger than the mean and median γiks in the non-affiliated group at 1% significance level.
These results suggest that, relative to non-affiliated hedge funds, significantly larger propor-
tion of funds’ returns in the affiliated group is attributable to recommendation changes. As
affiliated hedge funds do not have superior skills in stock trading, the higher exposure of
their returns to recommendation changes is consistent with the hypothesis that hedge funds
with prime brokerage affiliations are more likely to acquire private information on future
analysts’ recommendations.
Even the most intentional catering behavior can be unhelpful to hedge funds if the rec-
ommendation change does not move the stock price. In the unreported test, I construct
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recommendation factors by choosing 3 stocks with the lowest profits out of those invested
by hedge funds in affiliated and non-affiliated groups, respectively, and test the weights on
the recommendation factors in two groups through regression analyses. I find that the factor
loadings are comparable across affiliated and non-affiliated groups for both large and small
hedge funds.
The exposure analysis provide evidence that prime brokerage affiliations with analysts’
investment banks add values to hedge funds by providing them with profitable investment
opportunities. Investment banks offer benefits to hedge funds in addition to the prime
brokerage services they meant to provide, in order to attract customers and boost their
competitiveness in the prime businesses.
2.6 Conclusions
The paper examines the channel through which hedge funds obtain private information
on analysts’ recommendations by testing their trading behaviors before public release of
analysts’ reports. Empirical results provide strong support for the importance of prime
brokerage affiliations on information acquisition of hedge funds. First, I find that affiliated
hedge funds tend to buy (or sell) stocks one or two days before the public release of upgrade
(or downgrade) recommendations. Second, affiliated large hedge funds tend to buy upgrades
and sell downgrades in a larger magnitude compare to non-affiliated hedge funds. Third,
affiliated hedge funds have a higher probability to trade in a way that is consistent with
upcoming recommendation changes than non-affiliated hedge funds. Fourth, affiliated hedge
funds earn higher (or avoid lower) short-term abnormal returns by buying (or selling) before
upgrades (or downgrades) than non-affiliated hedge funds.
I show that, although affiliated large hedge funds have a higher (or lower) average pre-
release demands for upgrades (or downgrades) than non-affiliated hedge funds, the same
differences have not been observed in the post-recommendation tradings. Nor do I see a
difference in the magnitude of tradings between affiliated and non-affiliated small hedge
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funds. Nevertheless, I find that small hedge funds appear to acquire private information
from analysts’ investment banks, as the probability that affiliated small funds trade ahead
in the same direction as subsequent recommendation changes is higher compared to that of
non-affiliated funds.
The results are robust after controlling for the characteristics of analysts and recommen-
dations. I also test an alternative explanation that affiliated hedge funds are skillful enough
to invest in stocks that analysts issue profitable recommendations. The test results do not
bear out this explanation by showing that disparities of abnormal returns between affiliated
and non-affiliated hedge funds still exist even after controlling for fund managers’ alphas.
Some caveats should be noted in regards to the interpretation of my findings. First, data
limitations do not allow me to estimate the quantitative benefits of leaking information to
hedge funds. As a result, I am unable to build a direct connection between hedge fund
tradings and investment bank revenues from prime brokerage business. The classification of
large and small hedge funds alleviates this concern to some extent, as prime brokerage fees are
likely positively related to the size of investors. Second, an alternative potential explanation
for trading ahead is the analysts’ optimistic reporting. According to Bilinsky, Cumming, and
Hass (2014) and Chung and Teo (2012), analysts cater to hedge funds by issuing optimistic
research reports, so that hedge funds can make profits by trading ahead in the same direction
as the reports. The information leakage assertion does not disconfirming theirs, as both
arguments can coexist and share the same purposes. However, analyst reports are likely
to be determined by various factors in addition to the catering behaviors, and lacking of
comprehensive empirical analyses makes the explanation relatively weak. In conclusion,
the results provide strong evidence on the importance of investment banks in setting up
information channels between hedge funds and analysts.
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Figure 2.1: The cumulative hedge fund tradings: affiliated vs non-affiliated
The figure plots the number of cumulative tradings prior to recommendation changes of affiliate and
non-affiliated hedge funds by years. Affiliated hedge funds are hedge funds that use reporting analysts’
investment banks as their prime brokers. The remaining funds are non-affiliated hedge funds.
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Figure 2.2: The measures of hedge fund trading activities
The figure plots the averages of hedge fund tradings for two different fund groups: affiliated and
non-affiliated. The measures of hedge fund trading activities include holdings change, net trading value,
net trading ratio, and pre-release relative demand, which are defined in Section 4.1 and 4.2. Affiliated
hedge funds are hedge funds that use reporting analysts’ investment banks as their prime brokers. The
remaining funds are non-affiliated hedge funds. Hedge funds with asset under management no less than $1
billion are defined as large hedge funds, and small hedge funds otherwise.
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Figure 2.3: The post-recommendation CARs: affiliated vs. non-affiliated port-
folios
The figures plot the post-recommendation cumulative abnormal returns of stocks invested by affiliate and
non-affiliated hedge funds, with the top one for upgrades and the bottom one for downgrades. Affiliated
hedge funds are hedge funds that use reporting analysts’ investment banks as their prime brokers. The
remaining funds are non-affiliated hedge funds.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics of recommendation changes and hedge fund trad-
ings
This table presents summary statistics of recommendation changes and hedge fund tradings. The recommendation
change data are from I/B/E/S detail file matched with 13F institutional holding data and TASS hedge fund database
from 2003 to 2012. Panel A shows the distribution of recommendation changes in the sample. Panel B shows the
cumulative number of recommendation changes over years. Panel C shows the descriptive statistics for hedge fund
tradings in recommended stocks, where Net-rec refers to hedge funds that trade in the same direction as recommen-
dation changes, and Net-rec I refers to subsamples of Net-rec in which hedge fund tradings have different signs than
those of stock abnormal returns in the corresponding month. Panel D shows the summary statistics for regression
variables.
Panel A: recommendation change frequencies
Change in Frequency Percent Cumulative Cumulative
recommendations Frequency Percent
-4 3 0.08 3 0.08
-3 16 0.43 19 0.51
-2 816 22.07 835 22.58
-1 961 25.99 1796 48.57
0 593 16.04 2389 64.60
1 776 20.98 3165 85.59
2 533 14.41 3698 100
3 0 0 3698 100
4 0 0 3698 100
Panel B: cumulative recommendation changes
Total Upgrades Downgrades No change
2003 192 60 74 58
2004 506 205 248 53
2005 475 142 206 127
2006 388 108 259 21
2007 421 97 204 120
2008 442 197 179 66
2009 266 92 133 41
2010 173 70 96 7
2011 502 218 214 70
2012 333 120 183 30
Average 370 131 180 59
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Table 1 - continued
Panel C: descriptive statistics
Total Upgrades Downgrades NoChg Net-rec Net-rec I
All separate recommendation change samples
Num of firms 539
Num of investment banks 11
Num of analysts 550
Num of star analysts 25
Num of rec changes 750 273 374 103 571 273
Num of affiliated recs 177 62 70 45 148 64
Num of non-affiliated recs 573 211 304 58 423 209
Num of influential recs 136 55 81 0 105 50
Num of non-influential recs 614 218 293 103 466 223
All hedge fund samples
Num of hedge funds 176
Num of hedge fund tradings 3698 1309 1796 593 1460 652
Affiliated tradings 1130 362 441 327 417 182
Non-affiliated tradings 2568 947 1355 266 1043 470
Large hedge fund samples
Num of hedge funds 59
Num of hedge fund tradings 1599 581 758 260 645 279
Affiliated tradings 504 172 192 140 196 87
Non-affiliated tradings 1095 409 566 120 449 192
Small hedge fund samples
Num of hedge funds 117
Num of hedge fund tradings 2099 728 1038 333 815 373
Affiliated tradings 626 190 249 187 221 95
Non-affiliated tradings 1473 538 789 146 594 278
Panel D: summary statistics for regression variables
N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max
Analyst experience (yrs) 3698 2.409 2 3.164 0 17
Coverage 3698 5.392 5 3.052 1 22
Ln MV ($ million) 3559 3.846 3.881 0.701 1.790 5.549
Stock return (qtrly) 3635 0.021 0.021 0.198 -0.670 1.296
Stock turnover (qtrly) 3635 0.846 0.681 0.642 0.055 4.067
Hedge fund AUM (million) 3612 18.598 18.739 1.509 11.512 23.083
Hedge fund return (qtrly) 3509 0.0183 0.019 0.089 -0.609 0.744
Hedge fund flow (qtrly) 3612 0.146 0.000 2.998 -1.032 69.051
Hedge fund age (months) 3612 84.095 61.026 68.297 0 310.614
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Table 2.2: Statistical analysis of affiliated vs. non-affiliated trading
This table presents statistical analysis for the trading of affiliated and non-affiliated hedge funds prior to the release
of recommendations. Hedge fund tradings are measured through holdings change, net trading value, and net trading
ratio for upgrades (Panel A) and downgrades (Panel B), respectively. The last four columns test the mean differences,
with t-values in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: upgrades
Large hedge funds Small hedge funds Mean difference / t-value
Affiliated Non-aff. Affiliated Non-aff.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1)-(2) (3)-(4) (1)-(3) (3)-(2)
Holdings change (Million)
Mean 0.106 0.058 0.035 0.053 0.048** -0.018 0.069*** -0.023
Median 0.017 0.007 0.004 0.005 (2.25) (-1.06) (2.67) (-0.31)
Min -0.314 -0.201 -0.525 -0.524
Max 0.973 0.650 0.892 0.709
Net trading value ($ Million)
Mean 3.607 1.334 0.799 1.256 2.273*** -0.457 2.637*** -0.243
Median 0.389 0.129 0.126 0.149 (2.85) (-0.58) (3.28) (-0.73)
Min -41.075 -21.522 -70.072 -30.651
Max 44.598 24.405 48.099 48.873
Net trading ratio (%)
Mean 13.876 3.097 8.175 3.134 10.780*** 5.041*** 2.265* 5.078***
Median 9.918 2.469 6.981 2.174 (6.94) (5.52) (1.76) (5.26)
Min 0 0 0 0
Max 66.667 11.428 28.571 12.001
Panel B: downgrades
Large hedge funds Small hedge funds Mean difference / t-value
Affiliated Non-aff. Affiliated Non-aff.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1)-(2) (3)-(4) (1)-(3) (3)-(2)
Holdings change (Million)
Mean 0.028 0.093 0.085 0.040 -0.064** 0.045 -0.051** -0.008
Median 0.067 0.010 0.003 0.003 (-2.21) (1.36) (-2.20) (-0.28)
Min -0.893 -0.954 -2.011 -2.779
Max 1.652 2.364 2.983 2.979
Net trading value ($ Million)
Mean 0.733 2.538 2.354 0.942 -1.805** 1.412** -1.198** -0.702
Median 0.222 0.333 0.122 0.117 (-2.07) (2.20) (-2.02) (-0.39)
Min -30.091 -17.130 -25.381 -30.641
Max 33.856 61.259 38.204 35.168
Net trading ratio (%)
Mean 5.051 1.450 7.856 1.841 3.601*** 6.015*** -0.404 6.406***
Median 2.941 0.855 8.088 1.138 (6.19) (7.80) (-0.47) (4.58)
Min 0 0 0 0
Max 22.222 9.524 30.769 10.526
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Table 2.3: Pre- and Post-release relative trading demands
This table presents the statistics of relative trading demand of affiliated and non-affiliated hedge funds prior to (pre)
and subsequent to (post) the release of analyst recommendation changes. Relative trading demand is calculated as the
percentage change in aggregate holdings of a stock in a quarter by hedge funds, relative to other institutional investors.
Panel A and B present the relative trading demand for upgrade and downgrade recommendations, respectively. The
last four columns test the mean and median differences between the two groups using paired t-test and Wilcoxon
rank-sum test, respectively. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: upgrades
Relative demand
Affiliated Non-affiliated Difference test
Pre Post Pre Post t-value Wilcoxon p-val
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1)-(2) (3)-(4) (1)-(3) (2)-(4)
Large hedge funds
Mean 1.350 0.035 1.019 0.034 (2.76) (2.61) (0.0238) (0.307)
Median 0.252 -0.002 0.049 -0.007 *** ** **
Min -0.563 -0.472 -0.563 -0.521
Max 7.486 0.819 7.547 0.616
INST mean 0.038 0.008 0.038 0.008
Small hedge funds
Mean -0.008 0.083 0.005 0.022 (-0.71) (1.08) (0.438) (0.0643)
Median 0.048 0.018 -0.051 -0.005 *
Min -0.418 -0.178 -0.419 -0.303
Max 0.685 0.432 0.689 0.510
INST mean 0.137 -0.001 0.137 -0.001
Panel B: downgrades
Relative demand
Affiliated Non-affiliated Difference test
Pre Post Pre Post t-value Wilcoxon p-val
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1)-(2) (3)-(4) (1)-(3) (2)-(4)
Large hedge funds
Mean 0.355 0.060 0.610 0.107 (0.83) (3.1) (0.0476) (0.166)
Median -0.022 0.002 0.055 0.034 *** **
Min -0.563 -0.472 -0.578 -0.472
Max 3.401 0.819 3.527 0.861
INST mean 0.050 0.005 0.050 0.005
Small hedge funds
Mean 0.063 0.053 0.015 0.039 (0.38) (-0.22) (0.408) (0.523)
Median -0.013 0.025 -0.043 0.009
Min -0.405 -0.296 -0.405 -0.296
Max 0.744 0.479 0.850 0.496
INST mean 0.127 0.008 0.127 0.008
81
Table 2.4: The timing of hedge fund tradings prior to recommendation changes
This table presents the timing of affiliated and non-affiliated hedge fund trading by regressing stock
holdings changes in quarter t on subsequent recommendation changes. Following Klein, Saunders, and
Wong (2014), the estimated regression is: ∆sharej,i,t = αk + βk∆reci,d + εi,k, where ∆sharej,i,t is the
change in the number of shares held by hedge fund j in stock i during quarter t, and ∆reci,d is the change
of an analyst’s recommendation for stock i issued on day d (d = t + k, k = 1, 2, ..., 10 day(s)). Ups
and Downs refer to the samples that are associated with non-negative and non-positive recommendation
changes, respectively. Standard errors are two-way clustered by hedge funds and investment banks.
Yearly fixed effects are included. This table reports the estimated coefficients for affiliated and non-
affiliated hedge fund trading from 2003 to 2012. T-values are presented in parentheses. *, **, ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Day d = Form 13F βk from regression ∆sharej,i,t = αk + βk∆reci,d + εi,k
quarter-end Affiliated Non-affiliated
t + k day(s) Ups & Downs Ups Downs Ups & Downs Ups Downs
(k = 1, 2, ..., 10) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
d = t+ 1 0.013∗ 0.059∗∗ 0.036∗ 0.006 -0.011 -0.037
(1.76) (2.21) (1.72) (0.73) (-0.28) (-0.93)
d = t+ 2 0.021∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗† 0.001 -0.014 -0.008
(7.21) (3.89) (2.10) (0.21) (-0.59) (-0.62)
d = t+ 3 0.015 0.017∗ 0.001 0.007 0.003 0.012
(0.91) (1.68) (0.05) (1.26) (0.18) (0.92)
d = t+ 4 0.010 0.025 0.005 0.001 0.021 -0.013
(1.02) (1.15) (0.58) (0.12) (0.94) (-0.54)
d = t+ 5 0.121 0.012 -0.017 -0.004 -0.025 0.014
(1.17) (0.85) (-1.00) (0.46) (-0.71) (0.36)
d = t+ 6 -0.005 -0.006 -0.258 0.004 0.001 0.006
to t+ 10 (-0.37) (-0.24) (-1.25) (1.29) (0.15) (1.35)





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.10: The exposure of recommendation factors to the movements in hedge
fund returns
This table presents the exposure of hedge fund returns to analysts’ recommendation changes. I construct recommen-
dation factors by choosing 3 stocks with the highest earned profits out of those invested by affiliated hedge funds and
3 stocks with the highest earned profits out of those invested by non-affiliated hedge funds. I put each stock into one
of the six barrels that belong to two different groups and rank the stocks by earned profits from high (k = 1) to low
(k = 3) in each group. I refer to the time-series stock returns in each barrel as a recommendation factor. I regress the
monthly hedge fund returns on the recommendation factors and the Fama-French-Carhart four factors.
Rit =
∑3
k=1 βik A. RecFactorkt +
∑3
k=1 γik NA. RecFactorkt + δ1MKTt + δ2SMBt + δ3HMLt + δ4MOMt + εit
where A. RecFactorkt is the recommendation factor k in the affiliated group in month t, NA. RecFactorkt is the
recommendation factor k in the non-affiliated group in month t, Rit is the return of hedge fund i in month t, and
MKTt, SMBt, HMLt, and MOMt are the Fama-French-Carhart four factors, respectively. βik and γik are factor
loadings on recommendation factor k in the affiliated and non-affiliated groups, respectively, which reflect the extent
to which hedge fund returns are exposed to the recommendation changes. The last column tests the significance of
the differences in the means, with p-values in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
Large hedge funds Small hedge funds Mean difference / t-value
βik γik βik γik
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1)-(2) (3)-(4) (1)-(3)
k=1
Mean 0.515 0.230 0.258 0.171 0.285*** 0.087*** 0.257***
Median 0.127 0.053 0.096 0.049 (7.28) (3.09) (4.59)
Std dev 1.279 0.612 0.742 0.943
min 0.000 0.000 0.176 0.169
max 13.130 7.942 15.197 21.096
k=2
Mean 1.216 0.588 0.641 0.274 0.628*** 0.366*** 0.575***
Median 0.231 0.124 0.248 0.087 (5.67) (6.75) (3.76)
Std dev 3.645 1.352 1.735 0.697
min 0.001 0.0005 0.000 0.000
max 27.291 11.563 25.116 12.368
k=3
Mean 1.425 0.797 0.750 0.481 0.629*** 0.269*** 0.675***
Median 0.441 0.187 0.404 0.139 (6.07) (4.92) (4.34)
Std dev 3.640 2.276 1.899 1.095
min 0.0005 0.0001 0.0007 0.0005




HEDGE FUND INVESTMENT STRATEGIES
3.1 Introduction
Hedge funds are documented to play an important role in equity market and dominate
trading of certain stocks (Stein, 2009). It is generally agreed that markets are more efficient
when it comes to pricing large-cap stocks and less efficient for small-cap stocks. In this
context, studying the consensus wisdom in stock holding under different market efficiency
can help us understand fund managers’ skills in exploiting information advantages.
In this paper, we examine the investment value and risk consequence of stock holdings
concentration displayed by hedge funds. Hedge funds might focus their equity investments
on certain stocks if they believe the stocks will outperform the market or if they have su-
perior information about the profitability of the stocks. To assess the information content
in funds investment, we investigate the active holdings of hedge funds and aggregate their
decisions on the stock level. If active hedge funds deviate from benchmarks in a way that re-
veals information scattered among managers, the aggregate measure can be used to capture
information advantages and predict future performance of stocks.
As one of the most sophisticated traders, hedge funds exhibit skills not only in popu-
lar picks, but more importantly, they spend enormous resources on researching companies
overlooked by others. It is reported that 80% of Wall Street research is focused on 20%
publicly traded companies with market capitalization of over $1.5 billion, leaving a large
number of small companies with scant analyst coverage. For small companies, there is a
greater possibility of market inefficiencies due to a liquidity problem caused by relatively few
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freely traded shares. However, small companies have higher growth and are more likely to
increase shareholder value over time. Analyzing and uncovering data about small companies
will increase the chance of generating significant outcomes.
The first goal of this study is to examine whether hedge funds are skilled in equity
investments under different market efficiency. Specifically, we measure and test the future
performance of large-cap and small-cap stocks sorted by the holdings concentration of hedge
funds. For each stock, holdings concentration is measured by aggregating the deviations
of funds’ holdings from benchmarks. To maximize benchmark-adjusted return, an active
manager would overweight a stock if he believes the stock will outperform and underweight
it otherwise. As a result, stocks with higher holdings concentration are expected to have
higher future returns, especially in an inefficient market.
Despite the expected future performance, hedge fund holdings concentration may be
associated with substantial downside risks. Stein (2009) points out that hedge funds are
forced to delever as a result of negative return shocks in a security, and the crowding of
levered funds could drive the prices of the securities further down and lead to a fire sale
effect. Different than fund crowds, holdings concentration evaluates the extent to which a
fund focuses on a stock rather than the number of funds holding a stock. Previous research
documents that hedge fund crowding was a key contributor to the financial crisis over the
past 20 years (e.g. Kyle and Xiong (2001), Khandani and Lo (2011), and Acharya, Philippon,
Richardson, and Roubini (2009)). However, there is no direct examination of the downside
risks associated with holdings concentration.
Therefore, the second goal of this study is to examine whether holdings concentration
impose additional risks, especially when hedge funds are forced to delever during financial
crisis? Specifically, we test whether (i) stocks with higher holdings concentration have higher
downside risk, (ii) holdings concentration contributes to the low stock performance during
financial crisis, and (iii) hedge fund leverage exacerbates the negative impact of holdings
concentration?
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Using a comprehensive dataset of hedge funds and SEC 13F fillings, we find that stocks,
either large-cap or small-cap, heavily overweighed by active hedge funds, relative to their
benchmark index, perform substantially better than those being underweighted. The average
return spread of equal-weight stock portfolios is 1.34% for small-cap stocks and 0.63% for
large-caps, after adjustments for loadings on market, size, value, and momentum factors.
The spread is 0.65% for small-caps on a value-weight basis, whereas it is insignificant for
value-weight large-cap portfolios. These results demonstrate the superior ability of hedge
fund manager to trade stocks in both efficient and inefficient markets. As managers are
required to have better skills to process information in an inefficient market, the portfolio
tilting decisions by hedge funds are more valuable in trading small-cap stocks.
The results in this study establish a strong relation between holdings concentration and
stock future performance. Our findings show that both large-cap and small-cap stocks with
concentrated hedge fund holdings earn higher future returns than those with lower holdings
concentration. The results demonstrate that there is no return reversal for stocks that hedge
funds concentrate on, and the funds’ deviation from benchmarks positively predicts firms’
future performance. Consistent with Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Cao, Liang, Lo, and
Petrasek (2014), our findings suggest that hedge funds possess value-relevant information
that is not fully incorporated into stock prices, and the aggregate deviation from benchmarks
can help impound information into stock prices.
We find the evidence that the holding period stock returns up to one year subsequent
to the identified holdings concentration are persistently positive. we design a long-short
strategy that buys the stocks that average funds overweight and shorts the stocks that they
underweight and test the equal-weight portfolio abnormal returns in the following quarters.
The strategy generates an equal-weight alpha of 0.88% for large-cap portfolio and 0.86% for
small-cap portfolio in the first quarter and then starts experiencing negative abnormal returns
in the subsequent quarters, especially for small-cap stocks. For example, the long-short
strategy deployed on small-cap stocks with a delay of a quarter earns 2.39% less abnormal
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return generated by the same strategy implemented without a lag. These results suggest that
the investment value of concentrated portfolio dissipates quickly after fund holdings become
publicly available, as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires hedge funds
to disclose their portfolio with a maximum delay of 45 days. Our results also suggest that
it is possible to earn positive abnormal returns by replicating hedge fund equity investment
strategies based on SEC 13F fillings1.
By examining stock portfolios sorted by holdings concentration, we find that both large-
cap and small-cap stocks with concentrated hedge fund holdings have higher standard devi-
ation and downside risks. The results are statistically significant at 1% level based on both
traditional and Newey-West (1987) t-tests. These results suggest that holdings concentra-
tion could contribute to the risk that a stock faces. As informed trading by fund managers
can play an important role in determining stock prices, concentrating on a stock could drive
prices from fundamentals and increase the risks associated with it. Moreover, the returns
of small-cap stocks tend to skew to the right, and at each level of holdings concentration,
risks associated with small-cap stocks are relatively higher than those for large-cap stocks.
These findings suggest that, although small-cap stocks are less efficiently priced, managers
are capable of earning abnormal returns after controlling for risk factors.
We further examine whether the differential effect of holdings concentration is related
to hedge funds’ use of leverage. According to Stein (2009) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009), hedge fund leverage exacerbates negative externalities of hedge fund crowds and
create a fire sale during financial crisis. Consistent with previous studies that deleverage
leads to the negative return shock and downside risk in stocks, we find that small-cap stocks
are concentrated by hedge funds using relatively high leverage. Meanwhile, levered hedge
1For example, the AlphaClone Inc. deploys an investment strategy through analyzing SEC public filings
to learn the profitable positions held by sophisticated investors, and then building an index based on the
observed confident holdings.
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funds are less likely to concentrate their holdings on large-cap stocks, in order to avoid big
losses in the potential market downturns.
This study contributes to the literature on active portfolio management. It illustrates the
need to understand the relationship between active holdings and manager skills in balancing
risks and returns. Recent studies support the notion that active holdings predict future
performance. Cremers and Petajisto (2009) introduce active share to quantify active portfolio
management and find that active management predicts fund performance. Kacperczyk,
Sialm, and Zheng (2005) show that mutual funds with higher industry concentration achieve
better performance. Jiang and Sun (2014) find a strong link between the dispersion in
beliefs among active mutual funds and future stock returns. Using an aggregate stock-level
measure, this study supports the notion that active holdings predict individual stock future
performance. The test results imply that fund managers are skilled at exploiting information
advantages under different market efficiency.
This study also adds to the growing literature on hedge funds’ impacts on equity market.
Previous studies, such as Billio, Getmansky, Lo, and Pelizzon (2012) and Boyson, Stahel,
and Stulz (2011) document that hedge funds play an important role in spreading financial
crisis. Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) and and Griffin, Harris, Shu, and Topaloglu (2011)
find that hedge funds overweight high-priced technology stocks from 1998 to 2000 and sold
off those stocks quickly when the bubble start to burst. Cao, Liang, Lo, and Petrasek (2014)
show that increased hedge fund ownership leads to improved informational efficiency of stock
prices. This study adds to the literature by examining the downside risks associated with
aggregated active holdings. Our results provide evidence that levered hedge funds contribute
to the high risk and low performance during financial crisis.
We organize the rest of this paper as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the measuring
variables and presents sample construction and summary statistics; Section 3.3 explore the
information content of holdings concentration by examining stock future returns; Section 3.4
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presents risk analyses for stock with different levels of holdings concentration; Section 3.5
concludes the paper.
3.2 Measuring variables and sample construction
In this section, we introduce the construction of measuring variables, followed by sample
construction and summary statistics for hedge funds and stocks.
3.2.1 Measurements for holdings concentration
To capture managers’ consensus beliefs about the value of individual stocks, we construct
a measuring variable based on the aggregation of funds’ active holdings. The funds’ active
holdings for a given stock are defined as the difference between the weight of the stock in
each fund manager’s portfolio and that in the benchmark index2. Managers overweight a
stock if they expect it to outperform the benchmark index and underweight it otherwise. An
aggregate measure of managers’ decisions to deviate from benchmark captures the consensus
view of managers on the future value of stocks based on their information set.
We define holdings concentration as the aggregation of managers’ active holdings. Our
measure is based on Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992). Specifically, we use an stock
level measure by averaging the holdings deviation from benchmarks across all hedge funds
holding the stock. Letting HC measures the concentrated holdings of hedge funds that






[(wji,t − wbi,t)− E(w
j
i,t − wbi,t)] (3.1)
Where wji,t is the weight of stock i in fund j’s portfolio at the end of quarter t, w
b
i,t is the
weight of stock i in the benchmark portfolio at the end of quarter t, and Ni,t is the number
of funds invested in stock i at quarter t. E(wji,t − wbi,t) is an adjustment factor to allow
2See Cremers and Petajisto (2009).
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for random variation around expected deviation under the null hypothesis of independent
trading decisions by the funds. We average the difference in portfolio weights across all
stocks held by hedge fund j as a proxy for E(wji,t − wbi,t).
This equation defines and measures holdings concentration as the tendency of hedge
funds to weigh a given stock together and in the same direction more heavily than would
be expected by funds trading randomly and independently. Except for the overall funds,
we can measure the extent to which any subgroup of funds deviate from benchmarks by
calculating HC for that group. Stock with higher HC are anticipated to have a higher
holdings concentration.
We also use a conditional HC to measure concentrated holdings separately for hedge
funds overweight and underweight the stocks. We call the concentrated holdings deviation
as OHC for overweighted holdings and as UHC for underweighted holdings.
OHCi,t =HCi,t|wji,t > wbi,t (3.2)
UHCi,t =HCi,t|wji,t < wbi,t (3.3)
We average HC separately for these two measures based on how many fund holdings are
overweighted and underweighted. Thus, these measures are useful in analyzing stock future
performance following concentrated trading activities.
3.2.2 Sample and summary statistics
We use TASS database to identify all the hedge funds and hedge fund management com-
panies. The TASS database is one of the most comprehensive hedge fund database consisting
of monthly hedge fund returns, asset under management (thereafter, AUM), leverage, and
other fund-specific information. We used both Live” and Graveyard” funds to mitigate a
potential survivorship bias.
We identify hedge fund equity holdings based on institutional holdings from 13F fillings
to Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). As a private investment company, hedge
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funds with more than $100 million under management must report their holdings to the
SEC each quarter on form 13F, including all long positions (but no short position) in U.S.
stocks and a few other securities greater than 10,000 shares or $200,000 in the market value.
Holdings are reported at the management company level at the end of each calendar quarter.
Following the methodology of Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) and Griffin and Xu (2009),
we compile a list hedge fund management companies from TASS hedge fund databases,
and manually match them with the companies registered as investment advisers from 13F
database. If a firm is not registered, We include it in the sample, since registration is
a prerequisite for conducting non-hedge fund business such as advising mutual funds and
pension plans. If the firm is registered, we obtain its ADV form and check its eligibility for
the sample based on two criteria: (1) at least 50% of its clients are Other pooled investment
vehicles (e.g., hedge funds)” or High net worth individuals,” and (2) it charges a performance
fee for its advisory services. This process leaves us with 380 companies and 25,633 total stock
holdings.
Since holdings data are company-based, we upgrade fund-level characteristics in TASS
to the company-level to satisfy the consistency requirements. For example, a hedge fund
company’s asset under management is calculated as the sum of AUMs of all hedge funds
managed by the company at each time point. We include only hedge funds that have at
least $1 billion asset under management and have no less than 6 quarters of observations.
To construct our data set, we combine the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)
with TASS and 13F fillings. CRSP provides monthly returns, prices, and market values of
equity for common stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. We exclude closed-
end funds, real estate investment trusts (REIT), American Depository Receipts (ADR),
foreign companies, and primes. We eliminate stocks with prices below $5 at the portfolio
formation date. We divide stocks in our sample into large-cap and small-cap stocks by
mapping stocks to S&P500 index and Russell 2000 index, respectively. The S&P500 index
and Russell 2000 index are from Bloomberg.
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Table 3.1 Panel A and Panel B report the summary statistics for our hedge fund stock
holdings sample, which include a universe of 280 hedge fund management companies with
723 large-cap stocks and 3,856 small-cap stocks, spanning the period from 1994 to 2014. On
average, there are 167 large-cap stocks and 408 small-cap stocks held by each hedge fund. A
hedge fund invests $2.241 billion in large-cap stocks and $0.268 billion in small-cap stocks
on average. These results suggest that hedge fund managers not only invest in large-cap
stocks as other regular investors but also find ways to make money from small-cap stocks.
The overweighted holdings concentration is relatively bigger in large-cap stocks than that
in small-cap stocks, whereas underweighted holdings concentration is comparable across two
types of stocks. Panel C presents quintile ranked statistics based on holdings concentration
for large-cap and small-cap stocks. Holdings concentration for small-cap stocks spans wider
from -0.821 to 0.837 than large-cap stocks from -0.283 to 0.513. The number of funds holding
a large-cap stock decrease as holdings concentration increase, whereas the number of funds
holdings a small-cap stock increase as holdings concentration increase.
Table 3.2 reports the summary statistics of the characteristics of hedge funds invested
in stock portfolios ranked by holdings concentration. Panel A and Panel B show the results
for hedge funds holding large-cap and small-caps stocks, respectively. The hedge fund char-
acteristics include AUMt (in millions), which is calculated as the sum of AUMs of all the
hedge funds managed by a fund company at quarter t; Big HFs, which is calculated as the
number of hedge funds with AUM greater than $10 billion in each fund company; Returnt−1,
which is calculated as the percentage change of the net asset values of the fund company
between the beginning and the end of quarter t − 1; Return Stdt−1, which is calculated as
the standard deviation of the return of a hedge fund company in quarter t − 1; Aget (in
months), which is calculated as the asset weighted average age of the managed hedge funds.
The summary statistics suggest that smaller hedge funds with higher past returns are more
likely to concentrate their holdings on either large-cap or small-cap stocks.
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3.3 Holdings concentration and stock future performance
In this section, we evaluate the investment value of stock holdings concentrated by hedge
funds. We begin the analysis by examining the relationship between holdings concentration
and future stock returns. Then we evaluate the information content of the aggregate active
holdings and its implications for stock market efficiency and potential investment strategies.
3.3.1 Subsequent stock returns
According to Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), investors who are skilled at acquiring in-
formation through more efficient collection or processing of available information will be
rewarded with higher returns. Therefore, investigating the investment value of aggregate
active holdings can help us discover the information content of aggregate active holdings of
hedge fund and evaluate managers’ skills.
To understand how holdings concentration is related to the subsequent stock returns, at
the end of each quarter we sort stocks into quintiles in ascending order based on hedge fund
holdings concentration. The holdings concentration is computed using HC, OHC, and UHC
measures, separately. We then compute the average monthly equal-weight and value-weight
portfolio returns in the subsequent quarter. To adjust for risk, we consider various factor
models, including the CAPM, the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, the Carhart
(1997) four-factor model. We also use the characteristic-based benchmarks proposed by
Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (DGTW, 1997) to account for the possible nonlinear
relation between characteristics and returns. We perform the analysis for large-cap stocks
and small-cap stocks separately.
Panel A of Table 3.3 presents the results for the equal-weight and value-weight large-cap
stock portfolios using HC as measuring variable. We find that average portfolio returns
increase with concentration in active fund holdings in the past quarter. For stocks in the
top quintile with the highest holdings concentration, the average return is 1.66% per month,
whereas the average return for stocks in the bottom quintile with the lowest holdings con-
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centration is only 0.78% per month. The return spread of 0.88% per month is statistically
significant with a t-statistic of 10.33. To test whether the significantly positive return spread
can be explained by managers’ propensity to take risks, we examine the abnormal returns
using four risk-adjusted models. For example, from Carhart four-factor model, stocks in
the top quintile with highest holdings concentration realize an average abnormal return of
0.49%, whereas stocks in the bottom quitile with lowest concentration earn an average ab-
normal return of 0.01%. A long-short strategy that buys stocks in the top quitile and short
stocks in the bottom quintile generates an average monthly abnormal return of 0.48% in the
subsequent quarter with t-statistic 5.57.
The value-weight large-cap portfolio presents similar increasing relationship between
holdings concentration and the subsequent stock returns. Moreover, the difference in raw
returns between portfolios with high concentration and low concentration remains statisti-
cally significant and economically large. However, after controlling for risks, the some return
spreads become insignificant. For example, from the Fama-French three-factor model and
Carhart four-factor model, the average abnormal returns do not show monotonic increas-
ing relationship with holdings concentration. Their differences in abnormal returns between
portfolios with high and low holdings concentration are not significant. According to Fama
and French (2008), value-weight portfolio returns may be driven by a few very large-cap
stocks. As very large cap stocks are efficiently priced, hedge funds own little information
that has not been incorporated into their price. Therefore, the concentrated holdings in vary
large cap stocks presents little investment value for hedge funds.
Panel B of Table 3.3 presents the results for small-cap stock portfolios using HC as
measuring variable. We find similar positive relationship between holdings concentration
and average equal-weight portfolio returns for small-cap stocks. For stocks in the top quitile
with the highest holdings concentration, the average return is 1.78% per month, whereas the
average return for stocks in the bottom quitile with the lowest holdings concentration is 1.30%
per month. The return spread of 0.48% per month is statistically significant with a t-statistic
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of 6.50. The results hold when we examine the abnormal returns using four different risk-
adjusted models. The difference in Carhart four-factor abnormal returns between portfolios
with high and low concentrations is 1.34%, which is statistically significant and economically
large. In addition to the equal-weight portfolios, value-weight portfolios present similar
spreads in both average raw return and average abnormal returns calculated using four
different risk-factor models.
Panel C and Panel D show the average monthly returns for stock portfolios using over-
weighted holdings concentration (OHC) and underweighted holdings concentration (UHC),
respectively. For both large-cap and small-cap stocks in the top quintile with the highest
OHC, the average raw returns and abnormal returns are significantly higher than those in the
bottom quitile with the lowest OHC. In contrast, for stocks in the top quintile with the high-
est UHC, the average raw returns and abnormal returns are significantly lower than those
in the bottom quitile with the lowest UHC. These results provide evidence that hedge funds
overweigh stocks with high investment value and underweigh stocks with low investment
value.
From the above tests, compared to large-cap stocks, small-cap stocks display higher
investment value in the concentrated hedge fund holdings, as both their average raw returns
and abnormal returns are higher than those of large-cap stocks. Moreover, as evaluated by
four different risk-adjusted models, the abnormal return spreads of small-cap portfolio are
also higher than those of large-cap stock portfolios.
In summary, we find that the stock-level aggregate holdings concentration of active hedge
funds positively forecast future stock returns. Our results provide evidence that deviation
from benchmarks reflects managers’ information on stock future performance. We also find
that the investment values of concentrated holdings are significantly positive, especially in
small-cap stocks. Our results suggest that fund managers have skills to collect and process
information in an inefficient market, and the information is more valuable than that in an
efficient market.
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3.3.2 Holding period returns
To evaluate the performance of concentrated stock portfolios with different holding pe-
riod, we compare the cumulative abnormal returns of concentrated and non-concentrated
portfolios. Concentrated and non-concentrated portfolios refer to stock portfolios with the
highest and lowest holdings concentration, respectively. At the end of each quarter t, we sort
stocks into quintiles in ascending order based on hedge fund holdings concentration (HC).
Then start from time t, we compute the cumulative DGTW-adjusted abnormal returns over
the subsequent 1, 2, 3, 6, 9, and 12 months.
Panel A of Table 3.4 presents the average cumulative abnormal returns of concentrated
and non-concentrate stock portfolios. We find that, for both large-cap and small-cap stocks,
the average portfolio alpha increases with increasing number of months. For large-cap stocks,
the average alphas of concentrated portfolio over the subsequent time periods are higher
than those of non-concentrated portfolios. These results are all statistically significant and
economically large.
In contrast, for small-cap stocks, the average alpha of concentrated portfolios is signif-
icantly higher than that of non-concentrated portfolios only within one-month (t, t + 1),
two-month (t + 1, t + 2), and three-month (t + 1, t + 3). For example, the first quarter
average alpha is 2.17% for the concentrated portfolio and 0.88% for the non-concentrated
portfolio. The difference of average alpha between these two portfolios is 1.29% with t-
statistic 9.08. For cumulative time period greater than a quarter, the average alpha of the
non-concentrated portfolio increases with increasing number of months in a larger magnitude
than that of the concentrated portfolio. The average alpha spreads are significantly negative
within three-quarter (t+ 1, t+ 9) and four-quarter (t+ 1, t+ 12) time periods.
Our results provide evidence that hedge funds can earn significantly positive abnormal
returns by applying long-short strategy on the concentrated and non-concentrated stocks
with different holding periods. Consistent with the note that small-cap stocks are less effi-
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ciently priced, our results suggest that short-term trading on small-cap stocks can generate
significant amount of profits for hedge funds.
3.3.3 Market efficiency
If hedge funds have informational advantages about the stocks they overweight, we expect
that the value-relevant information will be incorporated into stock prices and reflected on
the stock returns. In this subsection, we study how fast the information is incorporated into
stock prices and what are the implications of holdings concentration for market efficiency.
We deploy a long-short strategy that buy stocks that hedge funds overweight in the
concentrated portfolios and short stocks that they underweight in the non-concentrated
portfolios. We compute the equal-weight DGTW alpha on these strategies in the following
three months (M1, M2, and M3) and four quarters (Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4). We also use
DGTW alpha Alpha0 on the strategy in the current month (quarter) as a benchmark to
measure the information content of holdings concentration. The monthly (quarterly) alphas
as well as alphas deflated by the benchmark alpha reflect the speed that information is
incorporated into stock prices and lead to zero abnormal return.
Panel B of Table 3.4 presents our test results for market efficiency. For both large-cap
and small-cap stocks, alphas in the first two months are positive and significant and become
negative in the third month. For example, the alpha for small-cap stocks is 0.71% with
t-statistic 17.56 in the first month and 0.28% with t-statistic 6.97 in the second month,
and then it becomes -0.21% with t-statistic -5.56 in the third month. Similar pattern can
be found in quarterly alpha of large-cap and small-cap stocks. The first quarter alpha is
significantly positive and then become negative in the following quarters. We also find that
the deflated alphas are significantly negative for large-cap and small-cap stocks and decrease
over all the subsequent time units.
Our results show that there is a time trend of enhanced market efficiency, and at some
point between the second and third month, abnormal return approaches zero. We find that
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the speed that information is incorporated into stock prices is comparable across large-cap
and small-cap stocks. However, there seem to be relatively larger amount of information con-
tained in the small-cap stocks concentrated by hedge funds than that contained in large-cap
ones. In addition, as the SEC requires all hedge funds to disclose their portfolio holdings with
a maximum delay of 45 days, it is possible to earn positive abnormal returns by replicating
hedge fund equity investment strategies based on SEC 13F fillings.
3.4 Holdings concentration and risk analysis
In this section, we perform the risk analyses on stocks with different levels of holdings
concentration. Then we examine the relationship between hedge fund leverage and the
concentration of their stock holdings.
3.4.1 Downside risks
So far we have shown the investment value of stock with concentrated hedge fund holdings
by examining the relationship between holdings concentration and future stock returns. A
concern we address here is whether holdings concentration imposes additional risk on stocks,
especially hedge funds are forced to delever during financial crisis. Stein (2009) points out
that hedge funds are forced to delever as a result of negative return shocks in a security, and
the crowding of levered funds could drive the prices of the securities further down and lead to
a fire sale effect. A stock’s potential to suffer a decline in value during financial crisis can be
captured by measuring downside risks of stocks in various ways. In this section, we compare
the downside risks of stock portfolios sorted by hedge fund holdings concentration. We
expect to see higher downside risk associated with stocks with higher holdings concentration
if the aggregate holdings deviation from benchmark destabilizes the market.
To properly value the risks associated with stocks, we deploy several measures. First,
we compute the standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis of stock returns according to
Liang and Park (2007). At the end of each month starting from January 1999, we use 60
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months rolling windows of previous returns to estimate the standard deviation and other risk
measures of each stock. That is, our five-year estimation window starts in January 1994,
and the test period spans 120 months from January 1999 to December 2014. If the stock
is available after January 2009, we use whatever return history is available during this time
period as long as the window is at least 24 months. For consistency, the same rule is applied
for other measures that we will introduce in the following.
Second, we use Value-at-Risk (VaR), Expected Shortfall (ES), and Tail Risk (TR) as
measures of downside risks. Although traditional risk measures we introduced above are
still dominant among practitioners, they may not capture many of the risk exposures of
stocks concentrated by hedge funds. According to the arbitrageur leverage model in Stein
(2009), hedge fund leverage exacerbates the negative externalities of hedge fund crowds due
to contagion effects during financial crisis. Therefore, the use of leverage and return structure
of hedge funds make it necessary to examine downside risks of the stocks concentrated by
hedge funds.
Value-at-Risk (VaR) is the maximum loss that can happen over a specific time horizon at
a specified confidence level. To estimate VaR, we choose the confidence level (1−α), the time
horizon (τ), and the estimation model. The statement we can make based on the estimation
model is: we are (1− α) percent certain that we will not lose more than V aR(α, τ) dollars
in τ days. In this study, we use the Cornish-Fisher (1937) expansion to estimate VaR in the
following, as the return distribution are skewed and leptokurtic and it is inappropriate to
use traditional VaR.
V aR(α) = −(µ+ Ω(α) ∗ σ) (3.4)
Where µ is the average return, σ is the standard deviation, Ω(α) is the Cornish-Fisher
expansion with skewness and kurtosis incorporated, and 1− α is the confidence level.
Expected Shortfall (ES) makes up for a shortcoming of VaR and quantifies the average
losses that are greater or equal to VaR. Based on the 95% Cornish-Fisher VaR calculated
above, we estimate ES using the following formula.
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ESt(α, τ) = −Et[Rt+τ |Rt+τ ≤ −V aRt(α, τ)] (3.5)
Where Rt+τ is the stock return during the period between t and t+ τ and V aRt(α, τ) is the
Cornish-Fisher VaR at the 1− α confidence level.
Tail Risk (TR) measures the deviation of losses greater or equal to VaR from mean. Rel-
ative to VaR and ES, TR can best capture the impact of an extremely low return observation
as the deviations from mean are squared. TR is defined as follows.
TRt(α, τ) =
√
Et[(Rt+τ − Et(Rt+τ )2|Rt+τ ≤ −V aRt(α, τ)] (3.6)
We execute the above mentioned 6 risk measures for all the stocks in our sample. To
understand the relationship between holdings concentration and downside risks, we sort
stocks into quintiles in ascending order based on holdings concentration (HC) at the end of
each quarter. The time series average of the cross sectional risks of all stocks in each quintile
is computed using our 6 different measures. We perform the analysis for large-cap and small-
cap stocks separately. To deal with the autocorrelation problem that might arise from the
60-month overlapping window, we present the t-statistics based on the Newey-West (1987)
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix as well as the traditional
t-statistics.
Panel A of Table 3.5 presents the risk analysis for large-cap stocks sorted by hedge fund
holdings concentration. We find that the expected return and the average standard deviation
of all the stocks in the portfolio are positively related to the holdings concentration. For
stocks in the top quintile with the highest holdings concentration, the expected return and
the standard deviation is 1.578% and 0.108, respectively, whereas they are 1.054% and 0.081
for stocks in the bottom quintile with the lowest holdings concentration. The spread of
standard deviations between the highest and lowest holdings concentration is 0.027 with a
standard t-statistic of 54.80 and a Newey-West t-statistic of 25.74.
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We next find that the average skewness of stocks in the top quintile of holdings con-
centration is 0.063, whereas stocks in the lower quintiles are left-skewed on average. The
spread of skewness between portfolios with the highest and lowest holdings concentration
is positive and significant, however, the skewness does not increase monotonically with the
holdings concentration. For example, the skewness is -0.009 in the second lowest quintile
but -0.027 in the second highest quintile. Our results also show that the distribution stock
returns in every quintile ranked from low to high are leptokurtic. Similarly, although the
spread of kurtosis is significantly positive, the kurtosis does not increase monotomically with
the holdings concentration.
We further find that the average VaR, ES, and TR increase monotonically with holdings
concentration. For example, the average VaR, ES, and TR in the bottom quintile with
the lowest holdings concentration are 0.118, 0.871%, and 0.041, respectively, whereas they
are 0.152, 1.109%, and 0.052, respectively, in the top quintile with the highest holdings
concentration. The spreads of VaR, ES, and TR between portfolios with the highest and
lowest holdings concentration are all positive and significant.
Panel B of Table 3.5 reports the risk analysis for small-cap stocks sorted by holdings
concentration. The risk measures of small-cap stocks present similar patterns as those of
large-cap stocks. The average return, standard deviation, VaR, ES, and TR all increase
monotonically with the increase of holdings concentration, with the risk values greater than
those of large-cap stocks in the corresponding quintile. Stocks in every quintile are right-
skewed and leptokurtic on average. The average skewness of stocks in the top quintile of
holdings concentration is significantly higher than that of stocks in the bottom quintile, and
both skewness and kurtosis do not increase monotonically with holdings concentration.
In summary, our results provide evidence that stocks, either large or small, with concen-
trated hedge fund holdings are associated with higher downside risks than those with less
concentrated holdings. Small-cap stocks are relatively riskier than large-cap stocks, as small
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stocks are less efficiently priced and unstable during a rare event. Making an investment in
small-cap stocks requires higher skills of fund managers.
3.4.2 Stock performance drop
Our tests above tell us that stocks with concentrated hedge fund holdings are associated
with higher downside risks. In this subsection, we examine the impact of holdings concen-
tration on stock performance in market downturns. Would the consensus deviations from
benchmarks drive stock prices down more quickly and exacerbate financial crisis?
To examine the negative impact of holdings concentration, we focus on stocks with de-
creased quarterly Carhart abnormal returns. We calculate the expected change of stock
returns ∆Rt+1 (∆Rt+1 = Rt+1−Rt) as the difference between the stock return at the end of
quarter t+1 and the stock return at the end of quarter t. We present the quarterly changes of
raw returns as well as risk adjusted returns of the concentrated and non-concentrated port-
folios, based on the CAPM, the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, the Carhart
(1997) four-factor model, and the portfolio performance using the DGTW (1997) character-
istic adjustment. The decrease of stock returns ∆Rt+1 subsequent to the identified holdings
concentration reflects the negative impact of holdings concentration on the already low stock
performance. We perform the analysis separately for crisis period, which includes year 2001
and 2007 Q4 - 2009 Q1, and for normal period.
Panel A of Table 3.6 presents the average quarterly change of large-cap stock returns
for the concentrated and non-concentrated portfolios. We find that the abnormal returns
of stocks with concentrated hedge fund holdings decrease more than those of stocks with
non-concentrated holdings. For example, the average decrease of Carhart alphas are -4.95%
for the concentrated portfolio and -2.29% for the non-concentrated portfolio during crisis
period, and are -3.61% and -2.58% for the two portfolios, respectively, during normal period.
The results are significantly negative in both crisis and normal periods.
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Panel B of Table 3.6 presents the average quarterly change of small-cap stock perfor-
mance. Similar to those of large-cap stocks, the abnormal returns of stocks with concen-
trated hedge fund holdings decrease more than those of stocks with non-concentrated hold-
ings during crisis period. However, the decreases of Carhart alphas are comparable across
two portfolios in normal period. In addition, the decreases of abnormal returns of the long-
short strategy during crisis period are significantly negative and smaller than those during
normal period. For example, the decrease of long-short DGTW alpha is -4.16% during crisis
period, whereas it is -2.73% during normal period. Our results suggest the greater impacts
of holdings concentration during crisis periods.
Our results provide evidence that concentrated holdings of hedge funds expedites the
decrease of stock abnormal returns, especially during financial crisis. Our results suggest
that holdings concentration has negative impacts on stock performance and could be a
catalyst for financial crisis.
3.4.3 Hedge fund leverage
Previous studies document that hedge fund deleverage leads to the negative return shocks
and downside risks in stocks. In this subsection, we examine whether the relatively high risks
associated with stocks concentrated by hedge funds are related to the use of leverage by hedge
funds. If the aggregate overweighting is a factor that deteriorate the negative impact of hedge
fund deleverage, we expect to see a positive relationship between average leverage of hedge
funds that holding a stock and the holdings concentration of the stock.
We use three measures to proxy for the hedge fund leverage. First, we compute the
ratio of 13F equity holdings to hedge fund company’s AUM. We remove samples with the
13F equity holdings/AUM ratio greater than 10%, which leaves us with about 90 percent of
original samples. We expect that the 13F equity holdings/AUM ratio is negatively related
to the use of leverage by hedge funds. Second, we calculate the number of big prime brokers
that a hedge fund uses. Prime brokers typically offer services such as margin financing,
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security lending, etc. to hedge funds. Hedge funds that use higher leverage are more likely
to get service from big prime brokers3, as big prime brokers are capable of providing them
with enough cash and a variety of securities to borrow. As a result, a positive relationship
between the number of big prime brokers and hedge fund leverage is expected. Third, we
use the average leverage of a hedge fund company as a direct proxy. The average leverage
of a fund company is calculated as the mean value of the average leverage of all hedge
funds managed by the company. The average leverage of a hedge fund is provided by TASS
database.
Panel A and Panel B of Table 3.7 presents the relationship between hedge fund leverage
and the holdings concentration in large-cap and small-cap stocks, respectively. We find that
the results are as expected for small-cap stocks. That is, hedge fund leverage is positively
related to the holdings concentration of small-cap stocks. Our results show that, as the hold-
ings concentration increases, the 13F equity holdings/AUM ratio decreases and the number
of big prime brokers and average leverage increase. The spreads of these three measuring
variables between portfolios with the highest concentration and lowest concentration are
-0.014, 0.956, and 0.276 with t-statistics -6.94, 3.66, and 2.43.
For large-cap stocks, however, the results are quite the opposite. The 13F equity hold-
ings/AUM ratio increases with the holdings concentration, and the number of big prime bro-
kers and average leverage decrease with the holdings concentration. The measuring spreads
between concentrated and non-concentrated portfolios are all statistically significant.
Our results suggest that, consistent with the note that small-cap stocks are less efficiently
priced, the concentration of leveraged hedge funds may easily impose additional risks on small
3According to the snapshots of TASS data from 2006 to 2012, the eleven major prime brokers ranked
by their average market share were Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, Credit Suisse, Deutsche
Bank, UBS, Citi, Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, Bank of America, and Merrill Lynch. In TASS, there are
465 global prime brokers, with top 11 biggest prime brokers account for about 86% of the market share in
hedge fund businesses.
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stocks. In addition, levered hedge funds may choose to diversify their holdings in large-cap
stocks, in order to avoid big losses in the potential market downturns.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper studies hedge fund managers’ consensus wisdom in stock holdings under dif-
ferent market efficiency by examining the investment value and risk consequence of holdings
concentration in large-cap and small-cap stocks. First, we find that stocks with concentrated
hedge fund holdings earn higher future returns than those with lower holdings concentration.
The holding period stock returns subsequent to the identified holdings concentration are per-
sistently positive. Second, stocks with concentrated hedge fund holdings are associated with
higher downside risks, and holdings concentration expedites the drop of stock performance,
especially during financial crisis. In addition, large-cap stocks with higher holdings concen-
tration are associated with hedge funds using lower leverage, whereas small-cap stocks are
concentrated by hedge funds using relatively high leverage.
This paper helps us understand managers’ skills in exploring information advantage by
investigating information content based on the aggregate active holdings of hedge funds.
Managers overweight a stock if he believes the stock will outperform and underweight it
otherwise. Our results provide evidence that fund managers have skills to collect and process
information under different market efficiency, and the information in an inefficient market is
more valuable than that in an efficient market. Our results also show that fund managers are
required to have higher skills to invest in an inefficient market, as stocks are less efficiently
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Figure 3.1: The average abnormal return of concentrated portfolio
The figure plots yearly average returns of the concentrated and non-concentrated portfolios for large-cap
and small-cap stocks, respectively. Concentrated and non-concentrated portfolios refers to stock portfolio
with the highest and lowest holdings concentration, respectively. The figure also plots yearly average
returns of two benchmark portfolios: S&P 500 and and Russell 2000.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics of hedge fund stock holdings
This table presents summary statistics of hedge fund holdings in large-cap and small-cap stocks. The hedge
fund data are from TASS hedge fund database and stock holdings data are from SEC 13F filings 1994-2014.
Large-cap stocks (Panel A) refer to stocks in S&P 500 index, and small-cap stocks (Panel B) refer to stocks
in Russell 2000 index. Benchmark refers to an index of hedge funds invest in a stock at the quarter end.
Holdings concentration is defined as the aggregation of managers’ active holdings and is measured by HC,
OHC, and UHC, respectively. Panel C presents holdings concentration quintile ranked statistics for large-cap
and small-cap stocks.
Panel A: Large-cap stocks (num of stocks: 723)
Mean Median Std Min Max
Num of stocks held per fund 167 147 110 1 359
Holdings of a stock per fund ($bn) 0.0309 0.0021 0.2075 0.0000 55.1132
Holdings of all stocks per fund ($bn) 2.2405 0.1389 15.3360 0.0000 856.8256
Holdings of a stock in benchmark ($bn) 13.8766 6.6570 23.2989 0.0000 644.4171
Holdings of all stocks in benchmark ($tr) 4.9945 4.8393 2.3382 0.9462 10.3210
Holdings concentration (HC) 0.0007 0.0002 0.0035 -0.0155 0.0591
Holdings concentration (OHC) -0.0005 -0.0019 0.0073 -0.0275 0.1455
Holdings concentration (UHC) 0.0007 0.0013 0.0021 -0.0373 0.0034
Panel B: Small-cap stocks (num of stocks: 3,856)
Mean Median Std Min Max
Num of stocks held per fund 408 293 360 1 1268
Holdings of a stock per fund ($bn) 0.0082 0.0012 0.0344 0.0000 2.6165
Holdings of all stocks per fund ($bn) 0.2683 0.0220 1.6469 0.0000 94.9964
Holdings of a stock in benchmark ($bn) 0.4651 0.2770 0.5279 0.0000 9.4428
Holdings of all stocks in benchmark ($tr) 0.5604 0.5115 0.3240 0.1054 1.3216
Holdings concentration (HC) -0.0007 -0.0015 0.0076 -0.1641 0.2273
Holdings concentration (OHC) -0.0029 -0.0045 0.0126 -0.1972 0.1848
Holdings concentration (UHC) 0.0007 0.0007 0.0015 -0.0715 0.0102
Panel C: Holdings concentration quintile rank
1 2 3 4 5
Large-cap stocks
Holdings concentration (HC) % -0.2835 -0.0708 0.0334 0.1588 0.5131
Stock weight in hedge fund % 1.2705 0.6764 0.7407 0.8791 1.4897
Stock weight in benchmark % 0.5715 0.2693 0.2571 0.2586 0.2852
Number of funds holding the stock 637 469 454 451 432
Small-cap stocks
Holdings concentration (HC) % -0.8206 -0.3029 -0.1411 0.0540 0.8368
Stock weight in hedge fund % 0.6637 0.5127 0.5175 0.7803 2.0439
Stock weight in benchmark % 0.0499 0.0515 0.561 0.0890 0.1873
Number of funds holding the stock 88 112 115 135 147
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Table 3.2: Holdings concentration and edge fund characteristics
This table presents the characteristics of hedge funds invested in stock portfolios ranked by holdings concen-
tration. The hedge fund characteristics include AUMt (in millions), which is calculated as the sum of AUMs
of all the hedge funds managed by a fund company at quarter t; Big HFs, which is calculated as the number
of hedge funds with AUM greater than $10 billion in each fund company; Returnt, which is calculated as the
percentage change of the net asset values of the fund company between the beginning and the end of quarter t;
Return Stdt, which is calculated as the standard deviation of the return of a hedge fund company in quarter
t; Aget (in months), which is calculated as the asset weighted average age of the managed hedge funds. Panel
A and Panel B show the results for hedge funds holding large-cap and small-caps stocks, respectively. The
last two rows report the mean difference of the characteristics of hedge funds holding stocks with the highest
concentration and those with the lowest concentration and the p-value.
Panel A: For hedge funds holding large-cap stocks
Holdings Num of AUMt Big Returnt Return Aget
Concentration (HC) HFs ($ M) HFs Stdt (Months)
Low 236 2.195 0.006 0.017 0.026 72
2 253 2.033 0.005 0.018 0.026 73
3 265 1.926 0.004 0.019 0.027 74
4 266 1.848 0.003 0.020 0.028 76
High 268 1.622 0.003 0.023 0.030 79
High-Low -0.573 -0.003 0.006 0.004 7
t-val (-6.53) (-3.85) (4.73) (8.12) (3.20)
Panel B: For hedge funds holding small-cap stocks
Holdings Num of AUMt Big Returnt Return Aget
Concentration (HC) HFs ($ M) HFs Stdt (Months)
Low 226 2.100 0.019 0.016 0.027 57
2 241 1.945 0.014 0.019 0.027 60
3 264 1.868 0.012 0.021 0.028 63
4 268 1.796 0.010 0.021 0.028 65
High 273 1.774 0.009 0.022 0.029 67
High-Low -0.326 -0.005 0.006 0.002 10
t-val (-10.07) (-3.95) (6.16) (9.67) (2.98)
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Table 3.3: Holdings concentration and subsequent stock returns
This table presents the subsequent stock returns on quintile portfolios sorted on the basis of holdings concentration of
hedge funds. At the end of each quarter from 1994 to 2014, We sort stocks into quintiles in ascending order based on
hedge fund holdings concentration and compute the average monthly equal-weight and value-weight portfolio returns
in the subsequent quarter. Holdings concentration is measured using HC, OHC, and UHC, separately. We also present
risk adjusted performance of those portfolios, based on the CAPM, the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, the
Carhart (1997) four-factor model, and the portfolio performance using the DGTW (1997) characteristic adjustment.
Stocks with price lower than $ 5 are excluded. Panel A and Panel B present the results using HC measure for large-cap
and small-caps stocks, respectively. Panel C and Panel D present the results using OHC and UHC measure. The last
two rows report the difference in mean abnormal returns for stocks with the highest concentration and those with the
lowest concentration and the t-value. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level are indicated by ***, **,
and *, respectively.
Panel A: Large-cap stock portfolio
Holdings Equal-weight portfolio returns % Value-weight portfolio returns %
Concentration Average CAPM FF Carhart DGTW Average CAPM FF Carhart DGTW
(HC) Return Alpha Alpha Alpha Alpha Return Alpha Alpha Alpha Alpha
Low 0.78 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.80 0.34 0.25 0.25 -0.17
2 1.05 0.18 0.09 0.13 0.06 0.77 0.35 0.32 0.31 -0.12
3 1.10 0.38 0.28 0.29 0.17 0.80 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.02
4 1.24 0.49 0.42 0.43 0.25 0.83 0.60 0.64 0.63 -0.09
High 1.66 0.82 0.51 0.49 0.71 1.13 0.82 0.56 0.53 0.27
High-Low 0.88∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.31 0.28 0.42∗∗∗
t-val (10.33) (34.08) (6.06) (5.57) (10.97) (4.06) (10.14) (1.48) (1.24) (4.68)
Panel B: Small-cap stock portfolio
Holdings Equal-weight portfolio returns % Value-weight portfolio returns %
Concentration Average CAPM FF Carhart DGTW Average CAPM FF Carhart DGTW
(HC) Return Alpha Alpha Alpha Alpha Return Alpha Alpha Alpha Alpha
Low 1.30 0.19 0.03 -0.14 0.34 0.48 0.21 0.21 0.17 -0.38
2 1.36 0.39 0.07 -0.11 0.26 0.59 0.68 0.43 0.03 -0.30
3 1.36 0.62 0.32 -0.05 0.26 0.77 1.01 0.72 0.82 -0.22
4 1.56 0.86 0.82 0.73 0.48 0.83 1.07 1.01 1.17 -0.14
High 1.78 1.11 1.27 1.20 0.74 0.92 1.03 0.87 0.83 0.07
High-Low 0.48∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗ 1.22∗∗∗ 1.34∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗
t-val (6.50) (11.09) (8.11) (4.75) (8.57) (6.76) (9.99) (3.88) (3.89) (5.06)
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Table 2 - Continued
Panel C: Stock portfolio ranked by OHC
Holdings Large-cap stock return % Small-cap stock return %
Concentration Average CAPM FF Carhart DGTW Average CAPM FF Carhart DGTW
(OHC) Return Alpha Alpha Alpha Alpha Return Alpha Alpha Alpha Alpha
Low 0.81 -0.23 -0.28 -0.24 -0.07 1.52 0.15 -0.19 -0.40 0.39
2 1.04 0.20 0.13 0.17 0.09 1.36 0.41 0.15 -0.00 0.24
3 1.05 0.37 0.28 0.29 0.15 1.39 0.63 0.49 0.06 0.26
4 1.33 0.56 0.49 0.51 0.37 1.57 0.86 0.82 0.77 0.48
High 1.59 0.94 0.65 0.61 0.63 1.74 1.11 1.26 1.18 0.70
High-Low 0.78 1.17 0.93 0.85 0.70 0.22 0.96 1.45 1.58 0.31
t-val (11.59) (45.50) (7.00) (6.38) (10.73) (5.09) (18.53) (5.98) (5.16) (6.92)
Panel D: Stock portfolio ranked by UHC
Holdings Large-cap stock return % Small-cap stock return %
Concentration Average CAPM FF Carhart DGTW Average CAPM FF Carhart DGTW
(UHC) Return Alpha Alpha Alpha Alpha Return Alpha Alpha Alpha Alpha
Low 1.17 0.74 0.51 0.49 0.27 1.65 1.09 0.90 0.80 0.53
2 1.36 0.66 0.56 0.57 0.40 1.57 0.59 0.65 0.60 0.47
3 1.16 0.30 0.21 0.24 0.19 1.57 0.59 0.65 0.60 0.47
4 1.12 0.12 0.04 0.07 0.15 1.42 0.53 0.40 0.11 0.32
High 1.01 0.03 -0.04 -0.03 0.12 1.28 0.38 0.16 -0.05 0.24
High-Low -0.16 -0.71 -0.55 -0.52 -0.39 -0.37 -0.71 -0.74 -0.85 -0.29
t-val (-2.70) (-9.07) (-4.29) (-3.95) (-2.49) (-9.31) (-9.67) (-3.28) (-2.65) (-6.67)
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Table 3.4: Holdings concentration and cumulative stock returns
This table presents future cumulative risk-adjusted returns of concentrated and non-concentrated portfolios. Con-
centrated and non-concentrated portfolio refer to stock portfolio with the highest and lowest holdings concentration,
respectively. For each stock, We calculate alpha as the difference between the stock return and the return of one of
125 benchmark portfolios that have comparable characteristics in size, book-to-market ratio, and past stock returns
(DGTW, 1997). Starting from the end of month t, the cumulative DGTW alpha over 1, 2, 3, 6, 9, and 12 months
are reported. In Panel A, the sample mean, mean difference, and t-value are presented for large-cap and small-caps
stocks, respectively. Panel B shows quarterly DGTW alpha of long-short strategy that buy stocks in the concentrated
portfolio and short stocks in the non-concentrated portfolio, implemented in the subsequent quarters Q1, Q2, Q3, and
Q4. DGTW alpha deflated by alpha at current quarter (Q0) and t-value are also reported. Statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
Panel A: concentrated vs non-concentrated
Large-cap portfolio alpha % Small-cap portfolio alpha %
Conc. NConc. Diff Conc. NConc. Diff
(t-1, t) 1.61 -0.82 2.45 *** 1.69 -0.62 2.31 ***
(15.60) (-7.55) (17.01) (23.34) (-7.38) (28.52)
(t, t+1) 1.17 -0.39 1.56 *** 1.22 -0.11 1.32 ***
(11.68) (-4.25) (11.82) (18.60) (-2.14) (16.59)
(t+1, t+2) 1.87 -0.52 2.39 *** 1.97 0.12 1.85 ***
(13.25) (-3.27) (12.43) (22.44) (-0.64) (16.20)
(t+1, t+3) 2.04 -0.18 2.22 *** 2.17 0.88 1.29 ***
(11.66) (-0.67) (9.63) (21.47) (3.74) (9.08)
(t+1, t+6) 2.29 0.42 1.87 *** 2.75 2.67 0.00
(10.06) (3.67) (5.78) (20.33) (9.80) (0.37)
(t+1, t+9) 2.46 1.02 1.45 *** 3.12 4.31 -1.19 ***
(9.90) (4.94) (4.95) (18.45) (12.94) (-4.53)
(t+1, t+12) 3.81 1.68 1.13 *** 3.35 5.67 -2.32 ***
(10.09) (5.73) (4.75) (17.34) (14.86) (-7.31)
Panel B: long-short strategy
Large-cap portfolio Alpha % Small-cap portfolio Alpha %
Alpha t-val Alpha t-val Alpha t-val Alpha t-val
- Alpha0 - Alpha0
M1 (t, t+1) 0.82*** (13.94) -0.38*** (-5.21) 0.71*** (17.56) -0.53*** (-8.20)
M2 (t+1, t+2) 0.39*** (6.81) -0.81*** (-10.00) 0.28*** (6.97) -0.91*** (-15.90)
M3 (t+2, t+3) -0.12* (-1.79) -1.32*** (-16.15) -0.21*** (-5.56) -1.39*** (-24.84)
Q1 (t+1, t+3) 0.88*** (9.37) -1.95*** (-9.96) 0.86*** (12.97) -2.39*** (-13.58)
Q2 (t+4, t+6) -0.21** (-2.01) -3.21*** (-17.12) -0.98** (-2.19) -3.66*** (-24.08)
Q3 (t+7, t+9) -0.18** (-2.40) -3.12*** (-15.87) -0.29*** (-4.21) -3.75*** (-25.03)
Q4 (t+10, t+12) -0.15** (-2.16) -3.15*** (-14.98) -0.32*** (-3.85) -3.53*** (-23.26)
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Table 3.5: Holdings concentration and risk analysis
This table shows time series average returns and risks of the portfolios with the concentration from low to high.
At the end of each quarter, 5 portfolios of stocks are formed on the basis of hedge fund holdings concentration,
weighted by the quarterly hedge fund stock holdings. At each month starting from January 1994, We use 60
month rolling windows of previous returns to estimate the risk measures of each portfolio. The risk measures
include standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, Value at Risk (VaR), expected shortfall (ES), and tail risk
(TR), among which VaR, ES, and TR are calculated based on Cornish-Fisher (1937) in the following.
V aR(α) = −(µ+ Ω(α) ∗ σ)
ESt(α, τ) = −Et[Rt+τ |Rt+τ ≤ −V aRt(α, τ)]
TRt(α, τ) =
√
Et[(Rt+τ − Et(Rt+τ )2|Rt+τ ≤ −V aRt(α, τ)]
The table also presents the mean difference of returns and risks between high concentration and low concen-
tration portfolios. Panel A and Panel B show the results for large-cap and small-caps stocks, respectively. The
standard t-statistics and the Newey-West (1987) adjusted t-statistics are provided. Statistical significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
Panel A: Large-cap stocks
Holdings Average STD Skewness Kurtosis VaR ES % TR
Concentration (HC) Return %
Low 1.054 0.081 -0.038 1.440 0.118 0.871 0.041
2 1.086 0.087 -0.009 1.518 0.127 0.926 0.043
3 1.207 0.091 -0.011 1.445 0.132 0.956 0.045
4 1.355 0.096 -0.027 1.347 0.140 0.996 0.047
High 1.578 0.108 0.063 1.499 0.152 1.109 0.052
High-Low 0.524*** 0.028*** 0.102*** 0.059*** 0.034*** 0.238*** 0.012***
Standard t-stat (45.63) (54.80) (11.12) (7.99) (47.67) (33.30) (47.10)
Newey-West t-stat (21.84) (25.74) (5.38) (3.92) (22.73) (15.91) (22.33)
Panel B: Small-cap stocks
Holdings Average STD Skewness Kurtosis VaR ES % TR
Concentration (HC) Return %
Low 1.063 0.097 0.245 1.844 0.136 1.025 0.046
2 1.266 0.104 0.170 1.519 0.146 1.083 0.050
3 1.433 0.108 0.180 1.403 0.150 1.120 0.052
4 1.609 0.111 0.200 1.442 0.152 1.138 0.052
High 1.756 0.115 0.263 1.727 0.154 1.175 0.054
High-Low 0.693*** 0.018*** 0.022*** -0.116 0.018*** 0.150*** 0.008***
Standard t-stat (73.82) (52.50) (6.67) (-1.67) (37.02) (31.31) (46.30)
Newey-West t-stat (35.24) (24.64) (3.20) (-0.82) (17.53) (14.95) (21.86)
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Table 3.6: Decrease of stock returns in crisis and normal periods
This table presents quarterly decrease of stock returns during crisis periods and normal periods. The expected
decrease of stock returns ∆Rt+1 is calculated as the difference between the stock return at quarter t + 1 and the
stock return at quarter t. The crisis periods include 2001 and 2007 Q4 - 2009 Q1. Stocks with Carhart ∆Rt+1 less
than zero are included in our sample. Panel A and Panel B present the results using HC measure for large-cap and
small-cap stocks, respectively. The last two rows report the difference in mean leverage for hedge funds holding
the stocks with the highest concentration and those with the lowest concentration and the t-statistics. Statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
Panel A: Large-cap stock portfolio
(%) ∆Rt+1 = Rt+1 −Rt
Crisis period Normal period
Conc. NConc. Diff t-val Conc. NConc. Diff t-val
(1) (2) (1)-(2) (3) (4) (3)-(4)
Raw return -4.43 0.57 -5.01*** (-3.38) -3.56 -0.43 -3.13*** (-7.77)
CAPM alpha -1.41 -0.91 -0.50*** (-3.62) -1.29 -0.90 -0.39*** (-7.42)
FF alpha -3.31 -0.89 -2.41** (-2.00) -2.11 -1.11 -1.00* (-1.93)
Carhart alpha -4.97 -2.29 -2.68** (-2.21) -3.61 -2.58 -1.02*** (-13.81)
DGTW alpha -5.02 -2.11 -2.91** (-2.07) -3.42 -0.22 -3.20*** (-7.81)
Panel B: Small-cap stock portfolio
(%) ∆Rt+1 = Rt+1 −Rt
Crisis period Normal period
Conc. NConc. Diff t-val Conc. NConc. Diff t-val
(1) (2) (1)-(2) (3) (4) (3)-(4)
Raw return -3.95 0.28 -4.23*** (-4.55) -3.68 -0.48 -3.19*** (-12.47)
CAPM alpha -2.05 -1.20 -0.85*** (-3.56) -2.48 -1.75 -0.73*** (-3.84)
FF alpha -4.79 -1.75 -4.05*** (-5.10) -4.32 -3.09 -1.23*** (-3.01)
Carhart alpha -7.84 -4.06 -3.78*** (-5.98) -8.71 -7.38 -1.33 (-1.30)
DGTW alpha -6.48 -2.32 -4.16*** (-4.21) -3.14 -0.41 -2.73*** (-9.79)
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Table 3.7: Holdings concentration and hedge fund leverage
This table presents the relationship between hedge fund leverage and the holdings concentration. We use
three measures for leverage: the ratio of 13F equity holdings to hedge fund AUM, the number of big prime
brokers, and the average leverage of a hedge fund company. Panel A and Panel B present the results for
large-cap and small-caps stocks, respectively. Sample means are presented for stock portfolios sorted by
holdings concentration. The last two rows report the difference in mean leverage for hedge funds holding
the stocks with the highest concentration and those with the lowest concentration and the t-statistics.
Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
Panel A: Large-cap stocks
Holdings 13F equity
holdings/AUM
Num of big prime brokers Average leverage
Concentration (HC)
Low 0.025 0.974 3.399
2 0.025 0.961 3.021
3 0.026 0.958 2.927
4 0.027 0.947 2.773
High 0.027 0.939 2.612
High-Low 0.002*** -0.035*** -0.787**
t-val (3.02) (-10.171) (-2.55)
Panel B: Small-cap stocks
Holdings 13F equity
holdings/AUM
Num of big prime brokers Average leverage
Concentration (HC)
Low 0.032 0.918 2.895
2 0.029 0.950 3.207
3 0.024 0.956 3.401
4 0.022 0.966 3.321
High 0.018 0.956 3.171
High-Low -0.014*** 0.038*** 0.276**
t-val (-6.94) (3.66) (2.43)
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